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Thursday, March 30, 2023

03-30-2023-0853 - COLLINS DICTIONARY (ENGLISH THESAURUS) [PERSPECTIVE] {DRAFT}

 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english-thesaurus/perspective

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03-30-2023-0837 - DETERMINISM (PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW) (SCHOOL OF THOUGHT [PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY], PERSPECTIVE [POINT OF VIEW, PHILOSOPHY PSYCHOLOGY], APPROACH (TO SCIENTIFIC METHOD), FRAME OF REFERENCE, POSITION, ETC.)

Determinism is a philosophical view, where all events are determined completely by previously existing causes. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. The opposite of determinism is some kind of indeterminism and even more so nondeterminism (aka randomness). Determinism is often contrasted with free will, although some philosophers claim that the two are compatible.[1][2]

Determinism is often used to mean causal determinism, which in physics is known as cause-and-effect. This is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state of an object or event is completely determined by its prior states. This meaning can be distinguished from other varieties of determinism mentioned below.

Debates about determinism often concern the scope of determined systems; some maintain that the entire universe is a single determinate system, and others identifying more limited determinate systems (or multiverse). Historical debates involve many philosophical positions and varieties of determinism. They include debates concerning determinism and free will, technically denoted as compatibilistic (allowing the two to coexist) and incompatibilistic (denying their coexistence is a possibility).

Determinism should not be confused with the self-determination of human actions by reasons, motives, and desires. Determinism is about interactions which affect our cognitive processes in our life.[3] It is about the cause and the result of what we have done. Cause and result are always bound together in cognitive processes. It assumes that if an observer has sufficient information about an object or human being, that such an observer might be able to predict every consequent move of that object or human being. Determinism rarely requires that perfect prediction be practically possible.

Varieties

"Determinism" may commonly refer to any of the following viewpoints.

Causal

Causal determinism, sometimes synonymous with historical determinism (a sort of path dependence), is "the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature."[4] However, it is a broad enough term to consider that:[5]

...One's deliberations, choices, and actions will often be necessary links in the causal chain that brings something about. In other words, even though our deliberations, choices, and actions are themselves determined like everything else, it is still the case, according to causal determinism, that the occurrence or existence of yet other things depends upon our deliberating, choosing and acting in a certain way.

Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. The relation between events may not be specified, nor the origin of that universe. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing in the universe that has no cause or is self-caused. Causal determinism has also been considered more generally as the idea that everything that happens or exists is caused by antecedent conditions.[6] In the case of nomological determinism, these conditions are considered events also, implying that the future is determined completely by preceding events—a combination of prior states of the universe and the laws of nature.[4] Yet they can also be considered metaphysical of origin (such as in the case of theological determinism).[5]

Many philosophical theories of determinism frame themselves with the idea that reality follows a sort of predetermined path.

Nomological

Nomological determinism, generally synonymous with physical determinism (its opposite being physical indeterminism), the most common form of causal determinism, is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events. Nomological determinism is sometimes illustrated by the thought experiment of Laplace's demon.[7] Nomological determinism is sometimes called scientific determinism, although that is a misnomer.

Necessitarianism

Necessitarianism is closely related to the causal determinism described above. It is a metaphysical principle that denies all mere possibility; there is exactly one way for the world to be. Leucippus claimed there were no uncaused events, and that everything occurs for a reason and by necessity.[8]

Predeterminism

Predeterminism is the idea that all events are determined in advance.[9][10] The concept is often argued by invoking causal determinism, implying that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain.

Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it is categorized as a specific type of determinism.[9][11] It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism—in the context of its capacity to determine future events.[9][12] Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism.[13][14]

Biological

The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of biological determinism, sometimes called genetic determinism.[15] Biological determinism is the idea that each of human behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by human genetic nature.

Friedrich Nietzsche explained that a human being is "determined" by his/her body, since he/she is subject to passions, impulsions and instincts.[16]

Fatalism

Fatalism is normally distinguished from "determinism",[17] as a form of teleological determinism. Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their future. Fate has arbitrary power, and need not follow any causal or otherwise deterministic laws.[6] Types of fatalism include hard theological determinism and the idea of predestination, where there is a God who determines all that humans will do. This may be accomplished either by knowing their actions in advance, via some form of omniscience[18] or by decreeing their actions in advance.[19]

Theological

Theological determinism is a form of determinism that holds that all events that happen are either preordained (i.e., predestined) to happen by a monotheistic deity, or are destined to occur given its omniscience. Two forms of theological determinism exist, referred to as strong and weak theological determinism.[20]

Strong theological determinism is based on the concept of a creator deity dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."[21]

Weak theological determinism is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge—"because God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed."[22] There exist slight variations on this categorisation, however. Some claim either that theological determinism requires predestination of all events and outcomes by the divinity—i.e., they do not classify the weaker version as theological determinism unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence—or that the weaker version does not constitute theological determinism at all.[23]

With respect to free will, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.[24]

Theological determinism can also be seen as a form of causal determinism, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God.[5] Some have asserted that Augustine of Hippo introduced theological determinism into Christianity in 412 CE, whereas all prior Christian authors supported free will against Stoic and Gnostic determinism.[25] However, there are many Biblical passages that seem to support the idea of some kind of theological determinism.

Adequate

Adequate determinism is the idea, because of quantum decoherence, that quantum indeterminacy can be ignored for most macroscopic events. Random quantum events "average out" in the limit of large numbers of particles (where the laws of quantum mechanics asymptotically approach the laws of classical mechanics).[26] Stephen Hawking explains a similar idea: he says that the microscopic world of quantum mechanics is one of determined probabilities. That is, quantum effects rarely alter the predictions of classical mechanics, which are quite accurate (albeit still not perfectly certain) at larger scales.[27] Something as large as an animal cell, then, would be "adequately determined" (even in light of quantum indeterminacy).[citation needed]

Many-worlds

The many-worlds interpretation accepts the linear causal sets of sequential events with adequate consistency yet also suggests constant forking of causal chains creating "multiple universes" to account for multiple outcomes from single events.[28] Meaning the causal set of events leading to the present are all valid yet appear as a singular linear time stream within a much broader unseen conic probability field of other outcomes that "split off" from the locally observed timeline. Under this model causal sets are still "consistent" yet not exclusive to singular iterated outcomes.

The interpretation sidesteps the exclusive retrospective causal chain problem of "could not have done otherwise" by suggesting "the other outcome does exist" in a set of parallel universe time streams that split off when the action occurred. This theory is sometimes described with the example of agent based choices but more involved models argue that recursive causal splitting occurs with all particle wave functions at play.[29] This model is highly contested with multiple objections from the scientific community.[such as?]

Philosophical varieties

Determinism in nature/nurture controversy

Nature and nurture interact in humans. A scientist looking at a sculpture after some time does not ask whether we are seeing the effects of the starting materials or of environmental influences.

Although some of the above forms of determinism concern human behaviors and cognition, others frame themselves as an answer to the debate on nature and nurture. They will suggest that one factor will entirely determine behavior. As scientific understanding has grown, however, the strongest versions of these theories have been widely rejected as a single-cause fallacy.[30] In other words, the modern deterministic theories attempt to explain how the interaction of both nature and nurture is entirely predictable. The concept of heritability has been helpful in making this distinction.

Determinism and prediction

A technological determinist might suggest that technology like the mobile phone is the greatest factor shaping human civilization.

Other "deterministic"[opinion] theories actually seek only to highlight the importance of a particular factor in predicting the future. These theories often use the factor as a sort of guide or constraint on the future. They need not suppose that complete knowledge of that one factor would allow the making of perfect predictions.

Structural

Structural determinism is the philosophical view that actions, events, and processes are predicated on and determined by structural factors.[32] Given any particular structure or set of estimable components, it is a concept that emphasizes rational and predictable outcomes. Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela popularized the notion, writing that a living system's general order is maintained via a circular process of ongoing self-referral, and thus its organization and structure defines the changes it undergoes.[33] According to the authors, a system can undergo changes of state (alteration of structure without loss of identity) or disintegrations (alteration of structure with loss of identity). Such changes or disintegrations are not ascertained by the elements of the disturbing agent, as each disturbance will only trigger responses in the respective system, which in turn, are determined by each system’s own structure.

On an individualistic level, what this means is that human beings as free and independent entities are triggered to react by external stimuli or change in circumstance. However, their own internal state and existing physical and mental capacities determine their responses to those triggers. On a much broader societal level, structural determinists believe that larger issues in the society—especially those pertaining to minorities and subjugated communities—are predominantly assessed through existing structural conditions, making change of prevailing conditions difficult, and sometimes outright impossible. For example, the concept has been applied to the politics of race in the United States of America and other Western countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, with structural determinists lamenting structural factors for the prevalence of racism in these countries.[34] Additionally, Marxists have conceptualized the writings of Karl Marx within the context of structural determinism as well. For example, Louis Althusser, a structural Marxist, argues that the state, in its political, economic, and legal structures, reproduces the discourse of capitalism, in turn, allowing for the burgeoning of capitalistic structures.

Proponents of the notion highlight the usefulness of structural determinism to study complicated issues related to race and gender, as it highlights often gilded structural conditions that block meaningful change.[35] Critics call it too rigid, reductionist and inflexible. Additionally, they also criticize the notion for overemphasizing deterministic forces such as structure over the role of human agency and the ability of the people to act. These critics argue that politicians, academics, and social activists have the capability to bring about significant change despite stringent structural conditions.

With free will

Main article: Free will

Philosophers have debated both the truth of determinism, and the truth of free will. This creates the four possible positions in the figure. Compatibilism refers to the view that free will is, in some sense, compatible with determinism. The three incompatibilist positions deny this possibility. The hard incompatibilists hold that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, the libertarians that determinism does not hold, and free will might exist, and the hard determinists that determinism does hold and free will does not exist. The Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza was a determinist thinker, and argued that human freedom can be achieved through knowledge of the causes that determine our desire and affections. He defined human servitude as the state of bondage of anyone who is aware of their own desires, but ignorant of the causes that determined them. However, the free or virtuous person becomes capable, through reason and knowledge, to be genuinely free, even as they are being "determined". For the Dutch philosopher, acting out of one's own internal necessity is genuine freedom while being driven by exterior determinations is akin to bondage. Spinoza's thoughts on human servitude and liberty are respectively detailed in the fourth[36] and fifth[37] volumes of his work Ethics.

The standard argument against free will, according to philosopher J. J. C. Smart, focuses on the implications of determinism for free will.[38] He suggests free will is denied whether determinism is true or not. He says that if determinism is true, all actions are predicted and no one is assumed to be free; however, if determinism is false, all actions are presumed to be random and as such no one seems free because they have no part in controlling what happens.

With the soul

Some determinists argue that materialism does not present a complete understanding of the universe, because while it can describe determinate interactions among material things, it ignores the minds or souls of conscious beings.

A number of positions can be delineated:

  • Immaterial souls are all that exist (idealism).
  • Immaterial souls exist and exert a non-deterministic causal influence on bodies (traditional free-will, interactionist dualism).[39][40]
  • Immaterial souls exist but are part of a deterministic framework.
  • Immaterial souls exist, but exert no causal influence, free or determined (epiphenomenalism, occasionalism)
  • Immaterial souls do not exist – there is no mind-body dichotomy, and there is a materialistic explanation for intuitions to the contrary.

With ethics and morality

Another topic of debate is the implication that determinism has on morality.

Philosopher and incompatibilist Peter van Inwagen introduced this thesis, when arguments that free will is required for moral judgments, as such:[41]

  1. The moral judgment that X should not have been done implies that something else should have been done instead.
  2. That something else should have been done instead implies that there was something else to do.
  3. That there was something else to do, implies that something else could have been done.
  4. That something else could have been done implies that there is free will.
  5. If there is no free will to have done other than X we cannot make the moral judgment that X should not have been done.

History

Determinism was developed by the Greek philosophers during the 7th and 6th centuries BCE by the Pre-socratic philosophers Heraclitus and Leucippus, later Aristotle, and mainly by the Stoics. Some of the main philosophers who have dealt with this issue are Marcus Aurelius, Omar Khayyám, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, David Hume, Baron d'Holbach (Paul Heinrich Dietrich), Pierre-Simon Laplace, Arthur Schopenhauer, William James, Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Ralph Waldo Emerson and, more recently, John Searle, Ted Honderich, and Daniel Dennett.

Mecca Chiesa notes that the probabilistic or selectionistic determinism of B. F. Skinner comprised a wholly separate conception of determinism that was not mechanistic at all. Mechanistic determinism assumes that every event has an unbroken chain of prior occurrences, but a selectionistic or probabilistic model does not.[42][43] 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism

Point of view (philosophy), in philosophy and psychology, the context for opinions, beliefs and experiences

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perspective

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point_of_view_(philosophy)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perspectivism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method#approaches

https://thesaurus.yourdictionary.com/perspective

DRAFT

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NOTE. PAN, PANORAMA, FRAME, BACKGROUND, STRUCTURE, POINTS, LINES, IMAGE, LEVEL, DEPTH, SENSATION, PERCEPTION, COGNITION, ALGORITHM, ANALYTICS, REASON, LOGIC, RATIONALE, OUTLINE, SLANT, VIEWPOINT, ATTITUDE, CONTEXT, CONTENT, EXPECTATION, PROSPECT, LINEAR-PERSPECTIVE, NARROW FOCUS, LENS, ANGLE OF APPROACH, CONCENTRATION, ATTENTION, BIAS, DISTORTION, OBSERVABLE UNIVERSE, MICROWAVE BACKGROUND RADIATION, OBSERVER, OBSERVATION, OBJECT, OBJECTIVE, ELUCIDATION, PREDILICTION, INCLINATION, INFERENCE, DISPOSITION, DEMEANOR, DISPARAGEMENT, DIRECTION, DISTANCE, ASPECT, VIEWPOINT, POINT OF ANALYSIS, OUTLIER, SCATTER, RANDOM, PERIPHERY, DETRACTOR, DISTRACTION, DETERRANT, DIVERSION, DECOY, DECEPTION, DERANGEMENT, DEFERRAL, PROCLIVITY, OPINION, PREFERENCE, VIEW, CONTAINMENT, BOUNDS, DEFINERS, QUALIFIERS, IDENTIFIERS, CATEGORIZERS, CATEGORIES, CLASSIFIERS, QUANTIFIERS, EQUATIZERS, OPERATORS, OPERATIONS, ZERO POINT, STRUCTURE, SCHEMATIC, SCHEMA, SCHEME, FUNCTION, STATISTICS, INFERENCE, DEDUCTION, EXTRAPOLATION, INTERPOLATION, ILLUSTRATION, EXAMPLE, PERMUTATION/COMMUNICATION/CONVERSION/COMMUNITIZATION/PERTURBATION/ABERRATION/DERIVATION/INTEGRATION/DEVIATION/PROPERTIZATION/ETC., COMMUTATIVE, ETC..

DRAFT


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03-30-2023-0836 - Hindsight bias, also known as the knew-it-all-along phenomenon[1] or creeping determinism

Hindsight bias, also known as the knew-it-all-along phenomenon[1] or creeping determinism,[2] is the common tendency for people to perceive past events as having been more predictable than they were.[3][4]

People often believe that after an event has occurred, they would have predicted or perhaps even would have known with a high degree of certainty what the outcome of the event would have been before the event occurred. Hindsight bias may cause distortions of memories of what was known or believed before an event occurred, and is a significant source of overconfidence regarding an individual's ability to predict the outcomes of future events.[5] Examples of hindsight bias can be seen in the writings of historians describing outcomes of battles, physicians recalling clinical trials, and in judicial systems as individuals attribute responsibility on the basis of the supposed predictability of accidents.[6][7][2]

In some countries, 20/20 indicates normal visual acuity at 20 feet, from which derives the idiom "hindsight is 20/20". 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindsight_bias

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03-30-2023-0835 - formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur

In philosophy, a formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur[1] (/ˌnɒn ˈsɛkwɪtər/; Latin for "[it] does not follow") is a pattern of reasoning rendered invalid by a flaw in its logical structure that can neatly be expressed in a standard logic system, for example propositional logic.[2] It is defined as a deductive argument that is invalid. The argument itself could have true premises, but still have a false conclusion.[3] Thus, a formal fallacy is a fallacy where deduction goes wrong, and is no longer a logical process. This may not affect the truth of the conclusion, since validity and truth are separate in formal logic.

While a logical argument is a non sequitur if, and only if, it is invalid, the term "non sequitur" typically refers to those types of invalid arguments which do not constitute formal fallacies covered by particular terms (e.g., affirming the consequent). In other words, in practice, "non sequitur" refers to an unnamed formal fallacy.

A special case is a mathematical fallacy, an intentionally invalid mathematical proof, often with the error subtle and somehow concealed. Mathematical fallacies are typically crafted and exhibited for educational purposes, usually taking the form of spurious proofs of obvious contradictions.

A formal fallacy is contrasted with an informal fallacy which may have a valid logical form and yet be unsound because one or more premises are false. A formal fallacy; however, may have a true premise, but a false conclusion.

Taxonomy

Prior Analytics is Aristotle's treatise on deductive reasoning and the syllogism. The standard Aristotelian logical fallacies are:

Other logical fallacies include:

In philosophy, the term logical fallacy properly refers to a formal fallacy—a flaw in the structure of a deductive argument, which renders the argument invalid.

It is often used more generally in informal discourse to mean an argument that is problematic for any reason, and encompasses informal fallacies as well as formal fallacies—valid but unsound claims or poor non-deductive argumentation.

The presence of a formal fallacy in a deductive argument does not imply anything about the argument's premises or its conclusion (see fallacy fallacy). Both may actually be true, or even more probable as a result of the argument (e.g. appeal to authority), but the deductive argument is still invalid because the conclusion does not follow from the premises in the manner described. By extension, an argument can contain a formal fallacy even if the argument is not a deductive one; for instance an inductive argument that incorrectly applies principles of probability or causality can be said to commit a formal fallacy.

Affirming the consequent

Main article: Affirming the consequent

Any argument that takes the following form is a non sequitur:

  1. If A is true, then B is true.
  2. B is true.
  3. Therefore, A is true.

Even if the premise and conclusion are both true, the conclusion is not a necessary consequence of the premise. This sort of non sequitur is also called affirming the consequent.

An example of affirming the consequent would be:

  1. If Jackson is a human (A), then Jackson is a mammal. (B)
  2. Jackson is a mammal. (B)
  3. Therefore, Jackson is a human. (A)

While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise:

  1. Humans are mammals.
  2. Jackson is a mammal.
  3. Therefore, Jackson is a human.

The truth of the conclusion is independent of the truth of its premise – it is a 'non sequitur', since Jackson might be a mammal without being human. He might be an elephant.

Affirming the consequent is essentially the same as the fallacy of the undistributed middle, but using propositions rather than set membership.

Denying the antecedent

Main article: Denying the antecedent

Another common non sequitur is this:

  1. If A is true, then B is true.
  2. A is false.
  3. Therefore, B is false.

While B can indeed be false, this cannot be linked to the premise since the statement is a non sequitur. This is called denying the antecedent.

An example of denying the antecedent would be:

  1. If I am Japanese, then I am Asian.
  2. I am not Japanese.
  3. Therefore, I am not Asian.

While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. The statement's declarant could be another ethnicity of Asia, e.g., Chinese, in which case the premise would be true but the conclusion false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.

Affirming a disjunct

Main article: Affirming a disjunct

Affirming a disjunct is a fallacy when in the following form:

  1. A or B is true.
  2. B is true.
  3. Therefore, A is not true.*

The conclusion does not follow from the premise as it could be the case that A and B are both true. This fallacy stems from the stated definition of or in propositional logic to be inclusive.

An example of affirming a disjunct would be:

  1. I am at home or I am in the city.
  2. I am at home.
  3. Therefore, I am not in the city.

While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. For all the reader knows, the declarant of the statement very well could be in both the city and their home, in which case the premises would be true but the conclusion false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.

*Note that this is only a logical fallacy when the word "or" is in its inclusive form. If the two possibilities in question are mutually exclusive, this is not a logical fallacy. For example,

  1. I am either at home or I am in the city. (but not both)
  2. I am at home.
  3. Therefore, I am not in the city.

Denying a conjunct

Denying a conjunct is a fallacy when in the following form:

  1. It is not the case that A and B are both true.
  2. B is not true.
  3. Therefore, A is true.

The conclusion does not follow from the premise as it could be the case that A and B are both false.

An example of denying a conjunct would be:

  1. I cannot be both at home and in the city.
  2. I am not at home.
  3. Therefore, I am in the city.

While the conclusion may be true, it does not follow from the premise. For all the reader knows, the declarant of the statement very well could neither be at home nor in the city, in which case the premise would be true but the conclusion false. This argument is still a fallacy even if the conclusion is true.

Illicit commutativity

Illicit commutativity is a fallacy when in the following form:

  1. If A is the case, then B is the case.
  2. Therefore, if B is the case, then A is the case.

The conclusion does not follow from the premise as unlike other logical connectives, the implies operator is one-way only. "P and Q" is the same as "Q and P", but "P implies Q" is not the same as "Q implies P".

An example of this fallacy is as follows:

  1. If it is raining, then I have my umbrella.
  2. If I have my umbrella, then it is raining.

While this may appear to be a reasonable argument, it is not valid because the first statement does not logically guarantee the second statement. The first statement says nothing like "I do not have my umbrella otherwise", which means that having my umbrella on a sunny day would render the first statement true and the second statement false.

Fallacy of the undistributed middle

Main article: Fallacy of the undistributed middle

The fallacy of the undistributed middle is a fallacy that is committed when the middle term in a categorical syllogism is not distributed. It is a syllogistic fallacy. More specifically it is also a form of non sequitur.

The fallacy of the undistributed middle takes the following form:

  1. All Zs are Bs.
  2. Y is a B.
  3. Therefore, Y is a Z.

It may or may not be the case that "all Zs are Bs", but in either case it is irrelevant to the conclusion. What is relevant to the conclusion is whether it is true that "all Bs are Zs," which is ignored in the argument.

An example can be given as follows, where B=mammals, Y=Mary and Z=humans:

  1. All humans are mammals.
  2. Mary is a mammal.
  3. Therefore, Mary is a human.

Note that if the terms (Z and B) were swapped around in the first co-premise then it would no longer be a fallacy and would be correct.

In contrast to informal fallacy

Main article: Informal fallacy

Formal logic is not used to determine whether or not an argument is true. Formal arguments can either be valid or invalid. A valid argument may also be sound or unsound:

  • A valid argument has a correct formal structure. A valid argument is one where if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.
  • A sound argument is a formally correct argument that also contains true premises.

Ideally, the best kind of formal argument is a sound, valid argument.

Formal fallacies do not take into account the soundness of an argument, but rather its validity. Premises in formal logic are commonly represented by letters (most commonly p and q). A fallacy occurs when the structure of the argument is incorrect, despite the truth of the premises.

As modus ponens, the following argument contains no formal fallacies:

  1. If P then Q
  2. P
  3. Therefore, Q

A logical fallacy associated with this format of argument is referred to as affirming the consequent, which would look like this:

  1. If P then Q
  2. Q
  3. Therefore, P

This is a fallacy because it does not take into account other possibilities. To illustrate this more clearly, substitute the letters with premises:

  1. If it rains, the street will be wet.
  2. The street is wet.
  3. Therefore, it rained.

Although it is possible that this conclusion is true, it does not necessarily mean it must be true. The street could be wet for a variety of other reasons that this argument does not take into account. If we look at the valid form of the argument, we can see that the conclusion must be true:

  1. If it rains, the street will be wet.
  2. It rained.
  3. Therefore, the street is wet.

This argument is valid and, if it did rain, it would also be sound.

If statements 1 and 2 are true, it absolutely follows that statement 3 is true. However, it may still be the case that statement 1 or 2 is not true. For example:

  1. If Albert Einstein makes a statement about science, it is correct.
  2. Albert Einstein states that all quantum mechanics is deterministic.
  3. Therefore, it's true that quantum mechanics is deterministic.

In this case, statement 1 is false. The particular informal fallacy being committed in this assertion is argument from authority. By contrast, an argument with a formal fallacy could still contain all true premises:

  1. If an animal is a dog, then it has four legs.
  2. My cat has four legs.
  3. Therefore, my cat is a dog.

Although 1 and 2 are true statements, 3 does not follow because the argument commits the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent.

An argument could contain both an informal fallacy and a formal fallacy yet lead to a conclusion that happens to be true, for example, again affirming the consequent, now also from an untrue premise:

  1. If a scientist makes a statement about science, it is correct.
  2. It is true that quantum mechanics is deterministic.
  3. Therefore, a scientist has made a statement about it.

Common examples

Main article: List of fallacies

"Some of your key evidence is missing, incomplete, or even faked! That proves I'm right!"[4]

"The vet can't find any reasonable explanation for why my dog died. See! See! That proves that you poisoned him! There’s no other logical explanation!"[5]

An Euler diagram illustrating a fallacy:
Statement 1: Most of the green is touching the red.
Statement 2: Most of the red is touching the blue.
Logical fallacy: Since most of the green is touching red, and most of the red is touching blue, most of the green must be touching blue. This, however, is a false statement.

In the strictest sense, a logical fallacy is the incorrect application of a valid logical principle or an application of a nonexistent principle:

  1. Most Rimnars are Jornars.
  2. Most Jornars are Dimnars.
  3. Therefore, most Rimnars are Dimnars.

This is fallacious. And so is this:

  1. People in Kentucky support a border fence.
  2. People in New York do not support a border fence.
  3. Therefore, people in New York do not support people in Kentucky.

Indeed, there is no logical principle that states:

  1. For some x, P(x).
  2. For some x, Q(x).
  3. Therefore, for some x, P(x) and Q(x).

An easy way to show the above inference as invalid is by using Venn diagrams. In logical parlance, the inference is invalid, since under at least one interpretation of the predicates it is not validity preserving.

People often have difficulty applying the rules of logic. For example, a person may say the following syllogism is valid, when in fact it is not:

  1. All birds have beaks.
  2. That creature has a beak.
  3. Therefore, that creature is a bird.

"That creature" may well be a bird, but the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Certain other animals also have beaks, for example: an octopus and a squid both have beaks, some turtles and cetaceans have beaks. Errors of this type occur because people reverse a premise.[6] In this case, "All birds have beaks" is converted to "All beaked animals are birds." The reversed premise is plausible because few people are aware of any instances of beaked creatures besides birds—but this premise is not the one that was given. In this way, the deductive fallacy is formed by points that may individually appear logical, but when placed together are shown to be incorrect.

Non sequitur in everyday speech

Main article: Non sequitur (literary device)
See also: Derailment (thought disorder)

In everyday speech, a non sequitur is a statement in which the final part is totally unrelated to the first part, for example:

Life is life and fun is fun, but it's all so quiet when the goldfish die.

— West with the Night, Beryl Markham[7]

See also

References

Notes
  • Barker, Stephen F. (2003) [1965]. "Chapter 6: Fallacies". The Elements of Logic (Sixth ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. pp. 160–169. ISBN 0-07-283235-5.

  • Harry J. Gensler, The A to Z of Logic (2010) p. 74. Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 9780810875968

  • Labossiere, Michael (1995). "Description of Fallacies". The Nizkor Project. Retrieved 2008-09-09.

  • "Master List of Logical Fallacies". utminers.utep.edu.

  • Daniel Adrian Doss; William H. Glover Jr.; Rebecca A. Goza; Michael Wigginton Jr. (17 October 2014). The Foundations of Communication in Criminal Justice Systems. CRC Press. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-4822-3660-6. Retrieved 21 May 2016.

  • Wade, Carole; Carol Tavris (1990). "Eight". In Donna DeBenedictis (ed.). Psychology. Laura Pearson (2 ed.). New York: Harper and Row. pp. 287–288. ISBN 0-06-046869-6.

    1. Quoted in Hindes, Steve (2005). Think for Yourself!: an Essay on Cutting through the Babble, the Bias, and the Hype. Fulcrum Publishing. p. 86. ISBN 1-55591-539-6. Retrieved 2011-10-04.
    Bibliography

    External links

    Wikiversity has learning resources about Recognizing Fallacies
    Wikimedia Commons has media related to Formal fallacies.

     

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_fallacy


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    03-30-2023-0833 - INFORMAL FALLACIES

    Informal fallacies are a type of incorrect argument in natural language. The source of the error is not just due to the form of the argument, as is the case for formal fallacies, but can also be due to their content and context. Fallacies, despite being incorrect, usually appear to be correct and thereby can seduce people into accepting and using them. These misleading appearances are often connected to various aspects of natural language, such as ambiguous or vague expressions, or the assumption of implicit premises instead of making them explicit.

    Traditionally, a great number of informal fallacies have been identified, including the fallacy of equivocation, the fallacy of amphiboly, the fallacies of composition and division, the false dilemma, the fallacy of begging the question, the ad hominem fallacy and the appeal to ignorance. There is no general agreement as to how the various fallacies are to be grouped into categories. One approach sometimes found in the literature is to distinguish between fallacies of ambiguity, which have their root in ambiguous or vague language, fallacies of presumption, which involve false or unjustified premises, and fallacies of relevance, in which the premises are not relevant to the conclusion despite appearances otherwise.

    The traditional approach to fallacies has received a lot of criticism in contemporary philosophy. This criticism is often based on the argument that the alleged fallacies are not fallacious at all, or at least not in all cases. To overcome this problem, alternative approaches for conceiving arguments and fallacies have been proposed. These include the dialogical approach, which conceives arguments as moves in a dialogue-game aimed at rationally persuading the other person. This game is governed by various rules. Fallacies are defined as violations of the dialogue rules impeding the progress of the dialogue. The epistemic approach constitutes another framework. Its core idea is that arguments play an epistemic role: they aim to expand our knowledge by providing a bridge from already justified beliefs to not yet justified beliefs. Fallacies are arguments that fall short of this goal by breaking a rule of epistemic justification. In the Bayesian approach, the epistemic norms are given by the laws of probability, which our degrees of belief should track.

    The study of fallacies aims at providing an account for evaluating and criticizing arguments. This involves both a descriptive account of what constitutes an argument and a normative account of which arguments are good or bad.[1][2] In philosophy, fallacies are usually seen as a form of bad argument and are discussed as such in this article. Another conception, more common in non-scholarly discourse, sees fallacies not as arguments but rather as false yet popular beliefs.[3]

    Traditional account

    Informal fallacies are a form of incorrect argument in natural language.[4] An argument is a series of propositions, called the premises, together with one more proposition, called the conclusion.[5][1] The premises in correct arguments offer either deductive or defeasible support for the conclusion. The source of the error in incorrect arguments can be in the argument's form, content or context. If the error is only due to the form, it is considered a formal fallacy. Informal fallacies may also include formal errors but they primarily involve errors on the level of content and context.[6][7][4][8][9] Informal fallacies are expressed in natural language. This brings with it various difficulties not faced when studying formal fallacies, like ambiguous terms, vague expressions or the premises being assumed implicitly rather than stated explicitly. Traditionally, a great number of informal fallacies have been listed, including the fallacy of equivocation, the fallacy of amphiboly, the fallacies of composition and division, the false dilemma, the fallacy of begging the question, the ad hominem fallacy or the appeal to ignorance.[10][11] The traditional approach tries to account for these fallacies using the concepts and theses discussed in this section.

    Arguments and fallacies

    Only arguments can constitute a fallacy. Various erroneous expressions do not count as fallacies because no argument was made, e.g. because no reasons were cited or no assertion was made.[5] The core idea of arguments is that the premises support the conclusion or that the conclusion follows from the premises.[5][3][1] Deductively valid arguments offer the strongest form of support: for them, it is impossible for the conclusion to be false if all the premises are true. The premises in non-deductive arguments offer a certain degree of support for their conclusion but they are defeasible:[5][12] it is possible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. Defeasible arguments may still be rationally compelling despite being fallible. So they do not automatically constitute fallacies.[13] The premises of an argument may be seen as the foundation on which the conclusion is built. According to this analogy, two things can go wrong and turn an argument into a fallacy. It could be that the foundation is shaky. But even a solid foundation is not helpful if it does not provide support for the conclusion in question.[5]

    Traditionally, fallacies have been defined by three necessary conditions: "a fallacy (i) is an argument, (ii) that is invalid, and (iii) appears to be valid."[3] This definition covers only formal fallacy since it has deductive invalidity as a necessary condition. But it can easily be modified to include informal fallacy by replacing this condition with a more general term, like logical weakness or incorrect reasoning.[3] The last clause includes a psychological element in referring to how the argument appears to the arguer. This clause is used to distinguish genuine fallacies from mere mistakes in reasoning, for example, due to carelessness.[3] The idea is that fallacies have an alluring element that goes beyond mere carelessness by seducing us into committing the mistake, thereby explaining why they are committed in the first place. Some philosophers reject this appeal to appearances because the reference to psychology would complicate the investigation in various ways.[1][3] One issue is that appearances are different for different people. This problem would also involve social sciences in order to determine which reference group of people to consult for defining fallacies.[1][3] It has been suggested that, at its core, the study of fallacies is about normative aspects of arguments and not about their persuasive force, which is studied by empirical psychology instead.[14][3]

    Form, content, and context

    The source of the error in incorrect arguments can lie in the argument's form, content, or context.[7] The form or structure of an argument is also called "rule of inference". The most well-known rule of inference is modus ponens, which states that given a premise of the form "If p then q" and another in the form "p", then the conclusion is "q". Rules of inferences are formal because it depends only on the structure or the syntax of the premises and not on their content. So an argument based on modus ponens is valid no matter what propositional contents are used for "p" and "q".[15]

    The content of an argument is found on the level of its propositions: it is what is expressed in them. The source of many informal fallacies is found in a false premise. For example, a false dilemma is a fallacy based on a false disjunctive claim that oversimplifies reality by excluding viable alternatives.[12][4][16]

    The context of an argument refers to the situation in which it is used.[3][1] Based on its context it may be intended to play different roles. One way for an argument to be fallacious is if it fails to perform the role it was supposed to play. The strawman fallacy, for example, involves inaccurately attributing a weak position to one's opponent and then refuting this position.[4][1] The argument itself may be valid in that the refutation of the opposed position really is successful. The error is found on the level of the context since the opponent does not hold this position. This dependence on a context means that the same argument may be successful in another context: against an opponent who actually holds the strawman position.[1]

    Natural language and contrast to formal fallacies

    Formal fallacies are deductively invalid arguments.[3][6][7][8] They are of special interest to the field of formal logic but they can only account for a small number of the known fallacies, for example, for affirming the consequent or denying the antecedent. Many other fallacies used in natural language, e.g. in advertising or in politics, involve informal fallacies.[1][9] For example, false dilemmas or begging the question are fallacies despite being deductively valid. They are studied by informal logic.[17][12] Part of the difficulty in analyzing informal fallacies is due to the fact that their structure is not always clearly expressed in natural language.[1] Sometimes certain keywords like "because", "therefore", "since" or "consequently" indicate which parts of the expression constitute the premises and which part the conclusion. But other times this distinction remains implicit and it is not always obvious which parts should be identified as the premises and the conclusions.[5] Many informal arguments include enthymematic premises: premises that are not explicitly stated but tacitly presumed.[1] In some domestic quarrels and political debates, it is not clear from the outset what the two parties are arguing about and which theses they intend to defend. Sometimes the function of the debate is more to clarify these preliminary points than to advance actual arguments.[1]

    The distinction between formal and informal fallacies is opposed by deductivists, who hold that deductive invalidity is the reason for all fallacies.[18] One way to explain that some fallacies do not seem to be deductively invalid is to hold that they contain various hidden assumptions, as is common for natural language arguments. The idea is that apparent informal fallacies can be turned into formal fallacies by making all these assumptions explicit and thereby revealing the deductive invalidity. The claim that this is possible for all fallacies is not generally accepted.[18][3] One requirement for a formal treatment is translating the arguments in question into the language of formal logic, a process known as "formalization".[19] Often many of the subtleties of natural language have to be ignored in this process. Some bodies of knowledge can be formalized without much residue but others resist formalization. This is also true for many informal fallacies.[19]

    Other approaches

    The traditional approach to fallacies has received a lot of criticism in contemporary philosophy.[3][9] This criticism is often based on the argument that some of the alleged fallacies are not fallacious at all, or at least not in all cases.[20][1] Various alternative approaches to how arguments and fallacies are to be conceived have been proposed. These alternatives often aim to show that, given their perspective, it is possible to evaluate if an alleged fallacy is actually fallacious in a given case.[3][1] The dialogical approach uses a game-theoretic framework to define arguments and sees fallacies as violations of the rules of the game. According to the epistemic approach, it is the goal of arguments to expand our knowledge by providing a bridge from already justified beliefs to not yet justified beliefs. Fallacies are arguments that fall short of this goal by breaking a rule of epistemic justification. It has been suggested that there may not be one single framework for evaluating all fallacies but only a manifold of ideals according to which a given argument may be good or bad.[3]

    Dialogical

    The dialogical approach sees arguments not simply as a series of premises together with a conclusion but as a speech act within a dialogue that aims to rationally persuade the other person of one's own position.[3][1][9] A prominent version of this approach is defended by Douglas N. Walton. On his game-theoretic conception, a dialogue is a game between two players.[3] At the outset, each player is committed to a set of propositions and has a conclusion they intend to prove. A player has won if they are able to persuade the opponent of their own conclusion. In this sense, dialogues can be characterized as "games of persuasion".[1] The players can perform various moves that affect what they are committed to. In this framework, arguments are moves that take the opponent's commitments as premises and lead to the conclusion one is trying to prove.[1] Since this is often not possible directly, various intermediary steps are taken, in which each argument takes a few steps towards one's intended conclusion by proposing an intermediary conclusion for the opponent to accept. This game is governed by various rules determining, among other things, which moves are allowed and when.[1][14] The dialogical approach makes it possible to distinguish between positive arguments, which support one's own conclusion, and negative arguments, which deny the opponent's conclusion.[1]

    From this perspective, fallacies are defined as violations of the dialogue rules.[3][14] They are "deceptively bad argument[s] that impede the progress of the dialogue".[3] The strawman fallacy, for example, involves inaccurately attributing a weak position to one's opponent[4] and then proving this position to lead to one's own conclusion. This mistake is not logical in the strict sense but dialogical: the conclusion may as well follow from these premises but the opponent does not hold these commitments.[1] In some cases, it varies from game to game whether a certain move counts as a fallacy or not. For example, there are cases where the tu quoque "fallacy" is no fallacy at all.[1] This argument, also known as appeal to hypocrisy, tries to discredit the opponent's argument by claiming that the opponent's behavior is inconsistent with the argument's conclusion.[4] This move does not necessarily break the rules of the dialogue.[1] Instead, it can reveal a weakness in the opponent's position by deflecting their criticism onto themself. This move shifts the burden of proof back to the opponent, thereby strengthening one's own position. But it still constitutes a fallacy if it is only used to evade an argument.[1]

    Epistemic

    The core idea behind the epistemic approach is that arguments play an epistemic role: they aim to expand our knowledge by providing a bridge from already justified beliefs to not yet justified beliefs.[9][2] Fallacies are arguments that fall short of this goal by breaking a rule of epistemic justification.[3] This explains, for example, why arguments that are accidentally valid are still somehow flawed: because the arguer himself lacks a good reason to believe the conclusion.[9]

    The fallacy of begging the question, on this perspective, is a fallacy because it fails to expand our knowledge by providing independent justification for its conclusion. Instead, the conclusion is already assumed in one of its premises.[2][12] A purely logical approach, on the other hand, fails to explain the fallacious nature of begging the question since the argument is deductively valid.[3]

    The Bayesian approach constitutes a special form of the epistemic approach.[3] Bayesianism interprets degrees of belief as subjective probabilities,[9] i.e. as the degree of certainty of the believer that the believed proposition is true. On this view, reasoning based on an argument can be interpreted as a process of changing one's degrees of belief, usually in response to new incoming information.[21][3] Fallacies are probabilistically weak arguments, i.e. they have a low probability on the Bayesian model.[21][3] Whether an argument constitutes a fallacy or not depends on the credences of the person evaluating the argument. This means that what constitutes a fallacy for one arguer may be a sound argument for another.[3][9] This explains why, when trying to persuade someone, one should take the audience's beliefs into account.[3] But it can also make sense of arguments independent of an audience, unlike the dialogical approach.[9]

    This perspective is well suited for explaining why some slippery slope arguments constitute fallacies but others not. Slippery slope arguments argue against a certain proposal based on the fact that this proposal would bring with it a causal chain of events eventually leading to a bad outcome.[4][9] But even if every step in this chain is relatively probable, probabilistic calculus may still reveal that the likelihood of all steps occurring together is quite small.[22][9] In this case, the argument would constitute a fallacy. But slippery slope arguments are rationally justified if the associated probabilities are sufficiently high.[22]

    Types

    A great variety of informal fallacies have been discussed in academic literature. There is controversy both concerning whether a given argument really constitutes a fallacy in all of its instances and concerning how the different fallacies should be grouped together into categories.[20][3][1] The categorization here follows proposals commonly found in the academic literature in these or similar terms.[11][8] It distinguishes between fallacies of ambiguity, which have their root in ambiguous or vague language, fallacies of presumption, which involve false or unjustified premises, and fallacies of relevance, in which the premises are not relevant to the conclusion despite appearances otherwise. Other categorizations have been proposed and some fallacies within this categorization could also be grouped in another category.[10][3]

    Fallacies of ambiguity

    The source of the error for fallacies of ambiguity lies in the usage of language. This is due to the fact that many terms in natural language have ambiguous or vague meanings.[23][12][8][1] Ambiguous terms have several meanings while vague terms have an unclear meaning. Fallacies of ambiguity often result in merely verbal disputes: the arguing parties have different topics in mind and thereby talk past each other without being aware of this.[23][12] One way to avoid or solve these fallacies is to clarify language, e.g. by committing to definitions and by introducing new distinctions.[24] Such reformulations may include a condensation of the original argument in order to make it easier to spot the erroneous step.[12]

    Fallacies of ambiguity are perhaps best exemplified by the fallacy of equivocation, in which the same term appears with two different meanings in the premises,[24][8][3][1] for example:

    Feathers are light. ("light" as "not heavy")
    What is light cannot be dark. ("light" as "pale in color")[25]
    Therefore, feathers cannot be dark.

    Equivocations are especially difficult to detect in cases where the two meanings are very closely related to each other.[12]

    The fallacy of amphiboly also involves ambiguity in meaning, but this ambiguity arises not on the level of individual terms but on the level of the sentence as a whole due to syntactic ambiguity,[24] for example:

    "The police were told to stop drinking on campus after midnight.
    So, now they are able to respond to emergencies much better than before"[3]

    On one interpretation, the police are not allowed to drink alcohol. On another, it is now the job of the police to stop other people from drinking. The argument seems plausible on the former reading but fallacious on the latter reading.[3]

    The fallacies of division and composition are due to ambiguity of the term "all" and similar expressions.[12][8][3] This term has both a collective and a distributive meaning. For example, the sentence "all the citizens are strong enough to resist a tyrant" may mean either that all together are strong enough (collective) or that each one individually is strong enough (distributive).[12] The fallacy of division is committed if one infers from the sentence in the collective sense that one specific individual is strong enough.[12][24] The fallacy of composition is committed if one infers from the fact that each member of a group has a property that the group as a whole has this property.[24] For example, "[e]very member of the investigative team was an excellent researcher", therefore "[i]t was an excellent investigative team".[3] Any form of fallaciously transferring a property from the whole to its parts or the other way round belongs to the category of fallacies of division and composition, even when linguistic ambiguity is not the cause.

    Fallacies of presumption

    Fallacies of presumption involve a false or unjustified premise but are often valid otherwise.[16][8] This problematic premise can take different forms and the belief in it can be caused in different ways, corresponding to the various sub-categories in this field. These fallacies include the naturalistic fallacy, the moralistic fallacy and the intentional fallacy.[12][18]

    A false dilemma is a fallacy of presumption based on a false disjunctive claim that oversimplifies reality by excluding viable alternatives.[16][12] For example, a false dilemma is committed when it is claimed that "Stacey spoke out against capitalism, therefore she must be a communist". One of the options excluded is that Stacey may be neither communist nor capitalist. Our liability to commit false dilemmas may be due to the tendency to simplify reality by ordering it through either-or-statements.[16]

    For fallacies of generalization, the false premise is due to an erroneous generalization. In the case of the fallacy of sweeping generalization, a general rule is applied incorrectly to an exceptional case. For example, "[e]veryone has a right to his or her property. Therefore, even though Jones had been declared insane, you had no right to take his weapon away."[16]: 147  The generalization, in this case, ignores that insanity is an exceptional case to which the general rights of property do not unrestrictedly apply. Hasty generalization, on the other hand, involves the converse mistake of drawing a universal conclusion based on a small number of instances.[16][8][20] For example, "I’ve met two people in Nicaragua so far, and they were both nice to me. So, all people I will meet in Nicaragua will be nice to me".[4]

    Begging the question is a form of circular reasoning in which the conclusion is already assumed in the premises.[16][12][8][3][1] Because of this, the premises are unable to provide independent support for the conclusion. For example, the statement "Green is the best color because it is the greenest of all colors", offers no independent reason besides the initial assumption for its conclusion. Detecting this fallacy can be difficult when a complex argument with many sub-arguments is involved, resulting in a large circle.[12]

    Fallacies of relevance

    Fallacies of relevance involve premises that are not relevant to the conclusion despite appearances otherwise.[12][8] They may succeed in persuading the audience nonetheless due to being emotionally loaded, for example, by playing on prejudice, pity or fear.[26]

    Ad hominem arguments constitute an important class among the fallacies of relevance. In them, the arguer tries to attack a thesis by attacking the person pronouncing this thesis instead of attacking the thesis itself.[26][12][8][20][1] Rejecting a theory in physics because its author is Jewish, which was common in the German physics community in the early 1930s, is an example of the ad hominem fallacy. But not all ad hominem arguments constitute fallacies. It is a common and reasonable practice in court, for example, to defend oneself against an accusation by casting doubt on the reliability of the witnesses. The difference between fallacious and justified ad hominem arguments depends on the relevancy of the character of the attacked person to the thesis in question. The author's cultural heritage seems to have very little relevance in most cases for theories in physics but the reliability of a witness in court is highly relevant for whether one is justified in believing their testimony. Whataboutism is a special form of the ad hominem fallacy that attempts to discredit an opponent's position by charging them with hypocrisy without directly refuting or disproving their argument.[27][28][29] It is particularly associated with Soviet and Russian propaganda.[30][31][32]

    Appeal to ignorance is another fallacy due to irrelevance.[26] It is based on the premise that there is no proof for a certain claim. From this premise, the conclusion is drawn that this claim must therefore be false. For example, "Nobody has ever proved to me there’s a God, so I know there is no God".[4] Another version of the appeal to ignorance concludes from the absence of proof against a claim that this claim must be true.

    Arguments from analogy are also susceptible to fallacies of relevance. An analogy is a comparison between two objects based on similarity.[33][12] Arguments from analogy involve inferences from information about a known object (the source) to the features of an unknown object (the target) based on the similarity between the two objects.[34] Arguments from analogy have the following form: a is similar to b and a has feature F, therefore b probably also has feature F.[33][35] The soundness of such arguments depends on the relevance of this similarity to the inferred feature.[36][12] Without this relevance, the argument constitutes a faulty or false analogy, for example: "If a child gets a new toy he or she will want to play with it; So, if a nation gets new weapons, it will want to use them".[3]

    See also

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Informal_fallacy

     

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