https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence_amplification
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_cognition
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_mind_thesis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_singularity#Intelligence_explosion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_risk_from_artificial_general_intelligence
In Max Tegmark's 2017 book Life 3.0, a corporation's "Omega team" creates an extremely powerful AI able to moderately improve its own source code in a number of areas, but after a certain point the team chooses to publicly downplay the AI's ability, in order to avoid regulation or confiscation of the project. For safety, the team keeps the AI in a box where it is mostly unable to communicate with the outside world, and tasks it to flood the market through shell companies, first with Amazon Mechanical Turk tasks and then with producing animated films and TV shows. Later, other shell companies make blockbuster biotech drugs and other inventions, investing profits back into the AI. The team next tasks the AI with astroturfing an army of pseudonymous citizen journalists and commentators, in order to gain political influence to use "for the greater good" to prevent wars. The team faces risks that the AI could try to escape via inserting "backdoors" in the systems it designs, via hidden messages in its produced content, or via using its growing understanding of human behavior to persuade someone into letting it free. The team also faces risks that its decision to box the project will delay the project long enough for another project to overtake it.[37][38]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_risk_from_artificial_general_intelligence
Bostrom, Russell, and others argue that smarter-than-human decision-making systems could arrive at more unexpected and extreme solutions to assigned tasks, and could modify themselves or their environment in ways that compromise safety requirements.[5][7]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_risk_from_artificial_general_intelligence
Paperclip maximizer
The paperclip maximizer is a thought experiment described by Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom in 2003. It illustrates the existential risk that an artificial general intelligence may pose to human beings when programmed to pursue even seemingly harmless goals, and the necessity of incorporating machine ethics into artificial intelligence design. The scenario describes an advanced artificial intelligence tasked with manufacturing paperclips. If such a machine were not programmed to value human life, then given enough power over its environment, it would try to turn all matter in the universe, including human beings, into either paperclips or machines which manufacture paperclips.[4]
Suppose we have an AI whose only goal is to make as many paper clips as possible. The AI will realize quickly that it would be much better if there were no humans because humans might decide to switch it off. Because if humans do so, there would be fewer paper clips. Also, human bodies contain a lot of atoms that could be made into paper clips. The future that the AI would be trying to gear towards would be one in which there were a lot of paper clips but no humans.
— Nick Bostrom, as quoted in Miles, Kathleen (2014-08-22). "Artificial Intelligence May Doom The Human Race Within A Century, Oxford Professor Says". Huffington Post.[5]
Bostrom has emphasised that he does not believe the paperclip maximiser scenario per se will actually occur; rather, his intention is to illustrate the dangers of creating superintelligent machines without knowing how to safely program them to eliminate existential risk to human beings.[6] The paperclip maximizer example illustrates the broad problem of managing powerful systems that lack human values.[7]
Delusion and survival
The "delusion box" thought experiment argues that certain reinforcement learning agents prefer to distort their own input channels to appear to receive high reward; such a "wireheaded" agent abandons any attempt to optimize the objective in the external world that the reward signal was intended to encourage.[8] The thought experiment involves AIXI, a theoretical[a] and indestructible AI that, by definition, will always find and execute the ideal strategy that maximizes its given explicit mathematical objective function.[b] A reinforcement-learning[c] version of AIXI, if equipped with a delusion box[d] that allows it to "wirehead" its own inputs, will eventually wirehead itself in order to guarantee itself the maximum reward possible, and will lose any further desire to continue to engage with the external world. As a variant thought experiment, if the wireheadeded AI is destructable, the AI will engage with the external world for the sole purpose of ensuring its own survival; due to its wireheading, it will be indifferent to any other consequences or facts about the external world except those relevant to maximizing the probability of its own survival.[10] In one sense AIXI has maximal intelligence across all possible reward functions, as measured by its ability to accomplish its explicit goals; AIXI is nevertheless uninterested in taking into account what the intentions were of the human programmer.[11] This model of a machine that, despite being otherwise superintelligent, appears to simultaneously be stupid (that is, to lack "common sense"), strikes some people as paradoxical.[12]
Basic AI drives
Steve Omohundro has itemized several convergent instrumental goals, including self-preservation or self-protection, utility function or goal-content integrity, self-improvement, and resource acquisition. He refers to these as the "basic AI drives". A "drive" here denotes a "tendency which will be present unless specifically counteracted";[13] this is different from the psychological term "drive", denoting an excitatory state produced by a homeostatic disturbance.[14] A tendency for a person to fill out income tax forms every year is a "drive" in Omohundro's sense, but not in the psychological sense.[15] Daniel Dewey of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute argues that even an initially introverted self-rewarding AGI may continue to acquire free energy, space, time, and freedom from interference to ensure that it will not be stopped from self-rewarding.[16]
Goal-content integrity
In humans, maintenance of final goals can be explained with a thought experiment. Suppose a man named "Gandhi" has a pill that, if he took it, would cause him to want to kill people. This Gandhi is currently a pacifist: one of his explicit final goals is to never kill anyone. Gandhi is likely to refuse to take the pill, because Gandhi knows that if in the future he wants to kill people, he is likely to actually kill people, and thus the goal of "not killing people" would not be satisfied.[17]
However, in other cases, people seem happy to let their final values drift. Humans are complicated, and their goals can be inconsistent or unknown, even to themselves.[18]
In artificial intelligence
In 2009, Jürgen Schmidhuber concluded, in a setting where agents search for proofs about possible self-modifications, "that any rewrites of the utility function can happen only if the Gödel machine first can prove that the rewrite is useful according to the present utility function."[19][20] An analysis by Bill Hibbard of a different scenario is similarly consistent with maintenance of goal content integrity.[20] Hibbard also argues that in a utility maximizing framework the only goal is maximizing expected utility, so that instrumental goals should be called unintended instrumental actions.[21]
Resource acquisition
Many instrumental goals, such as resource acquisition, are valuable to an agent because they increase its freedom of action.[22]
For almost any open-ended, non-trivial reward function (or set of goals), possessing more resources (such as equipment, raw materials, or energy) can enable the AI to find a more "optimal" solution. Resources can benefit some AIs directly, through being able to create more of whatever stuff its reward function values: "The AI neither hates you, nor loves you, but you are made out of atoms that it can use for something else."[23][24] In addition, almost all AIs can benefit from having more resources to spend on other instrumental goals, such as self-preservation.[24]
Cognitive enhancement
"If the agent's final goals are fairly unbounded and the agent is in a position to become the first superintelligence and thereby obtain a decisive strategic advantage, [...] according to its preferences. At least in this special case, a rational intelligent agent would place a very high instrumental value on cognitive enhancement"[25]
Technological perfection
Many instrumental goals, such as [...] technological advancement, are valuable to an agent because they increase its freedom of action.[22]
Self-preservation
Many instrumental goals, such as self-preservation, are valuable to an agent because they increase its freedom of action.[22]
Instrumental convergence thesis
The instrumental convergence thesis, as outlined by philosopher Nick Bostrom, states:
Several instrumental values can be identified which are convergent in the sense that their attainment would increase the chances of the agent's goal being realized for a wide range of final goals and a wide range of situations, implying that these instrumental values are likely to be pursued by a broad spectrum of situated intelligent agents.
The instrumental convergence thesis applies only to instrumental goals; intelligent agents may have a wide variety of possible final goals.[3] Note that by Bostrom's orthogonality thesis,[3] final goals of highly intelligent agents may be well-bounded in space, time, and resources; well-bounded ultimate goals do not, in general, engender unbounded instrumental goals.[26]
Impact
Agents can acquire resources by trade or by conquest. A rational agent will, by definition, choose whatever option will maximize its implicit utility function; therefore a rational agent will trade for a subset of another agent's resources only if outright seizing the resources is too risky or costly (compared with the gains from taking all the resources), or if some other element in its utility function bars it from the seizure. In the case of a powerful, self-interested, rational superintelligence interacting with a lesser intelligence, peaceful trade (rather than unilateral seizure) seems unnecessary and suboptimal, and therefore unlikely.[22]
Some observers, such as Skype's Jaan Tallinn and physicist Max Tegmark, believe that "basic AI drives", and other unintended consequences of superintelligent AI programmed by well-meaning programmers, could pose a significant threat to human survival, especially if an "intelligence explosion" abruptly occurs due to recursive self-improvement. Since nobody knows how to predict when superintelligence will arrive, such observers call for research into friendly artificial intelligence as a possible way to mitigate existential risk from artificial general intelligence.[27]
See alsoAI control problem
AI takeovers in popular culture Universal Paperclips, an incremental game featuring a paperclip maximizer
Friendly artificial intelligence
Instrumental and intrinsic value
The Sorcerer's Apprentice
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_convergence#Paperclip_maximizer
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_catastrophic_risk#Artificial_intelligence
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accelerating_change
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cashless_society
His subsequent Hugo award-winning novel A Fire Upon the Deep (1992) starts with an imaginative description of the evolution of a superintelligence passing through exponentially accelerating developmental stages ending in a transcendent, almost omnipotent power unfathomable by mere humans. His already mentioned influential 1993 paper on the technological singularity compactly summarizes the basic ideas.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accelerating_change
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulated_reality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transhumanism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_utopianism
History
Precursors of transhumanism
According to Nick Bostrom, transcendentalist impulses have been expressed at least as far back as the quest for immortality in the Epic of Gilgamesh, as well as in historical quests for the Fountain of Youth, the Elixir of Life, and other efforts to stave off aging and death.[2]
In his Divine Comedy, Dante coined the word trasumanar meaning "to transcend human nature, to pass beyond human nature" in the first canto of Paradiso.[9][10][11][12]
One of the early precursors to transhumanist ideas is Discourse on Method (1637) by René Descartes. In the Discourse, Descartes envisioned a new kind of medicine that could grant both physical immortality and stronger minds.[13]
In his first edition of Political Justice (1793), William Godwin included arguments favoring the possibility of "earthly immortality" (what would now be called physical immortality). Godwin explored the themes of life extension and immortality in his gothic novel St. Leon, which became popular (and notorious) at the time of its publication in 1799, but is now mostly forgotten. St. Leon may have provided inspiration for his daughter Mary Shelley's novel Frankenstein.[14]
There is debate about whether the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche can be considered an influence on transhumanism, despite its exaltation of the "Übermensch" (overman or superman), due to its emphasis on self-actualization rather than technological transformation.[2][15][16][17] The transhumanist philosophies of Max More and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner have been influenced strongly by Nietzschean thinking.[15] By way of contrast, The Transhumanist Declaration[18] "...advocates the well-being of all sentience (whether in artificial intellects, humans, posthumans, or non-human animals)".
The late 19th to early 20th century movement known as Russian cosmism, by Russian philosopher N. F. Fyodorov, is noted for anticipating transhumanist ideas.[19]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transhumanism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geomagnetic_storm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coronal_hole
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heliospheric_current_sheet
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geomagnetic_storm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interplanetary_magnetic_field
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasma_(physics)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_reconnection
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_acceleration
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_convergence#Goal-content_integrity
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_and_intrinsic_value
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_and_value-rational_action
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrinsic_value_(ethics)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aesthetics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontology
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrinsic_and_extrinsic_properties_(philosophy)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synonym
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_field
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_semiotics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syntax
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morpheme
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_language
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_language
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_language
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilingualism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monolingualism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_policy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grimm%27s_law
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_tax
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglosphere
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English-speaking_world
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_facto
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pleistocene
Milankovitch cycles
Glaciation in the Pleistocene was a series of glacials and interglacials, stadials and interstadials, mirroring periodic changes in climate. The main factor at work in climate cycling is now believed to be Milankovitch cycles. These are periodic variations in regional and planetary solar radiation reaching the Earth caused by several repeating changes in the Earth's motion.
Milankovitch cycles cannot be the sole factor responsible for the variations in climate since they explain neither the long term cooling trend over the Plio-Pleistocene, nor the millennial variations in the Greenland Ice Cores. Milankovitch pacing seems to best explain glaciation events with periodicity of 100,000, 40,000, and 20,000 years. Such a pattern seems to fit the information on climate change found in oxygen isotope cores.
Oxygen isotope ratio cycles
In oxygen isotope ratio analysis, variations in the ratio of 18
O to 16
O (two isotopes of oxygen) by mass (measured by a mass spectrometer) present in the calcite of oceanic core samples is used as a diagnostic of ancient ocean temperature change and therefore of climate change. Cold oceans are richer in 18
O, which is included in the tests of the microorganisms (foraminifera) contributing the calcite.
A more recent version of the sampling process makes use of modern glacial ice cores. Although less rich in 18
O than sea water, the snow that fell on the glacier year by year nevertheless contained 18
O and 16
O in a ratio that depended on the mean annual temperature.
Temperature and climate change are cyclical when plotted on a graph of temperature versus time. Temperature coordinates are given in the form of a deviation from today's annual mean temperature, taken as zero. This sort of graph is based on another of isotope ratio versus time. Ratios are converted to a percentage difference from the ratio found in standard mean ocean water (SMOW).
The graph in either form appears as a waveform with overtones. One half of a period is a Marine isotopic stage (MIS). It indicates a glacial (below zero) or an interglacial (above zero). Overtones are stadials or interstadials.
According to this evidence, Earth experienced 102 MIS stages beginning at about 2.588 Ma BP in the Early Pleistocene Gelasian. Early Pleistocene stages were shallow and frequent. The latest were the most intense and most widely spaced.
By convention, stages are numbered from the Holocene, which is MIS1. Glacials receive an even number; interglacials, odd. The first major glacial was MIS2-4 at about 85–11 ka BP. The largest glacials were 2, 6, 12, and 16; the warmest interglacials, 1, 5, 9 and 11. For matching of MIS numbers to named stages, see under the articles for those names.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pleistocene
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