| Part of the Politics series |
| Basic forms of government |
|---|
| List of forms of government |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 Politics portal |
Authoritarianism is a political system characterized by the rejection of political plurality, the use of strong central power to preserve the political status quo, and reductions in the rule of law, separation of powers, and democratic voting.[1][2] Political scientists have created many typologies describing variations of authoritarian forms of government.[2] Authoritarian regimes may be either autocratic or oligarchic and may be based upon the rule of a party or the military.[3][4] States that have a blurred boundary between democracy and authoritarianism have some times been characterized as "hybrid democracies", "hybrid regimes" or "competitive authoritarian" states.[5][6][7]
The political scientist Juan Linz, in an influential[8] 1964 work, An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, defined authoritarianism as possessing four qualities:
- Limited political pluralism, which is achieved with constraints on the legislature, political parties and interest groups.
- Political legitimacy based on appeals to emotion and identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems, such as underdevelopment or insurgency."
- Minimal political mobilization, and suppression of anti-regime activities.
- Ill-defined executive powers, often vague and shifting, used to extend the power of the executive.[9][10]
Minimally defined, an authoritarian government lacks free and competitive direct elections to legislatures, free and competitive direct or indirect elections for executives, or both.[11][12][13][14] Broadly defined, authoritarian states include countries that lack civil liberties such as freedom of religion, or countries in which the government and the opposition do not alternate in power at least once following free elections.[15] Authoritarian states might contain nominally democratic institutions such as political parties, legislatures and elections which are managed to entrench authoritarian rule and can feature fraudulent, non-competitive elections.[16] In contexts of democratic backsliding, scholars tend to identify authoritarian political leaders based on certain tactics, such as: politicizing independent institutions, spreading disinformation, aggrandizing executive power, quashing dissent, targeting vulnerable communities, stoking violence, and corrupting elections.[17] Since 1946, the share of authoritarian states in the international political system increased until the mid-1970s but declined from then until the year 2000.[18]
Characteristics
Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized government power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential challengers. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime.[19] Adam Przeworski has theorized that "authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear and economic prosperity."[20] However, Daniel A. Bell and Wang Pei used China's experience with COVID-19 to argue that the categories are not so clear cut.[21]
Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise of political power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors", the arbitrary deprivation of civil liberties and little tolerance for meaningful opposition.[19] A range of social controls also attempt to stifle civil society while political stability is maintained by control over and support of the armed forces, a bureaucracy staffed by the regime and creation of allegiance through various means of socialization and indoctrination.[19]
Authoritarianism is marked by "indefinite political tenure" of the ruler or ruling party (often in a one-party state) or other authority.[19] The transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic form of government is referred to as democratization.[19]
Constitutions in authoritarian regimes
Authoritarian regimes often adopt "the institutional trappings" of democracies such as constitutions.[22] Constitutions in authoritarian states may serve a variety of roles, including "operating manual" (describing how the government is to function); "billboard" (signal of regime's intent), "blueprint" (outline of future regime plans), and "window dressing" (material designed to obfuscate, such as provisions setting forth freedoms that are not honored in practice).[23] Authoritarian constitutions may help legitimize, strengthen, and consolidate regimes.[24] An authoritarian constitution "that successfully coordinates government action and defines popular expectations can also help consolidate the regime's grip on power by inhibiting re coordination on a different set of arrangements."[25] Unlike democratic constitutions, authoritarian constitutions do not set direct limits on executive authority; however, in some cases such documents may function as ways for elites to protect their own property rights or constrain autocrats' behavior.[26]
The Soviet Russia Constitution of 1918, the first charter of the new Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), was described by Vladimir Lenin as a "revolutionary" document. It was, he said, unlike any constitution drafted by a nation-state.[27] The concept of "authoritarian constitutionalism" has been developed by legal scholar Mark Tushnet.[28] Tushnet distinguishes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes from "liberal constitutionalist" regimes ("the sort familiar in the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by means of varying institutional devices") and from purely authoritarian regimes (which reject the idea of human rights or constraints on leaders' power).[28] He describes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes as (1) authoritarian dominant-party states that (2) impose sanctions (such as libel judgments) against, but do not arbitrarily arrest, political dissidents; (3) permit "reasonably open discussion and criticism of its policies"; (4) hold "reasonably free and fair elections", without systemic intimidation, but "with close attention to such matters as the drawing of election districts and the creation of party lists to ensure as best it can that it will prevail – and by a substantial margin"; (5) reflect at least occasional responsiveness to public opinion; and (6) create "mechanisms to ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the level it regards as desirable." Tushnet cites Singapore as an example of an authoritarian constitutionalist state, and connects the concept to that of hybrid regimes.[28]
Economy
Scholars such as Seymour Lipset,[29] Carles Boix, Susan Stokes,[30] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens[31] argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy).[32]
Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances the bourgeoise and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances.[33] Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.[34]
According to Michael Albertus, most land reform programs tend to be implemented by authoritarian regimes that subsequently withhold property rights from the beneficiaries of the land reform. Authoritarian regimes do so to gain coercive leverage over rural populations.[35]
Institutions
Authoritarian regimes typically incorporate similar political institutions to that of democratic regimes, although they may serve different purposes. Democratic regimes are marked by institutions that are essential to economic development and individual freedom, including representative legislatures and competitive political parties.[36][37] Most authoritarian regimes embrace these political structures, but use it in a way that reinforces their power.[36] Authoritarian legislatures, for example, are forums through which leaders may enhance their bases of support, share power, and monitor elites.[38] Additionally, authoritarian party systems are extremely unstable and unconducive to party development, largely due to monopolistic patterns of authority.[39]
Democratic and authoritarian arguably differ most prominently in their elections. Democratic elections are generally inclusive, competitive, and fair.[40] In most instances, the elected leader is appointed to act on behalf of the general will. Authoritarian elections, on the other hand, are frequently subject to fraud and extreme constraints on the participation of opposing parties.[39] Autocratic leaders employ tactics like murdering political opposition and paying election monitors to ensure victory.[36][41] Despite this, the proportion of authoritarian regimes with elections and support parties has risen in recent years.[36] This is largely due to the increasing popularity of democracies and electoral autocracies, leading authoritarian regimes to imitate democratic regimes in hopes of receiving foreign aid and dodging criticism.[36][42]
According to a 2018 study, most party-led dictatorships regularly hold popular elections. Prior to the 1990s, most of these elections had no alternative parties or candidates for voters to choose. Since the end of the Cold War, about two-thirds of elections in authoritarian systems allow for some opposition, but the elections are structured in a way to heavily favor the incumbent authoritarian regime.[43]
Hindrances to free and fair elections in authoritarian systems may include:[43]
- Control of the media by the authoritarian incumbents.
- Interference with opposition campaigning.
- Electoral fraud.
- Violence against opposition.
- Large-scale spending by the state in favor of the incumbents.
- Permitting of some parties, but not others.
- Prohibitions on opposition parties, but not independent candidates.
- Allowing competition between candidates within the incumbent party, but not those who are not in the incumbent party.
Interactions with other elites and the masses
The foundations of stable authoritarian rule are that the authoritarian prevents contestation from the masses and other elites. The authoritarian regime may use co-optation or repression (or carrots and sticks) to prevent revolts.[44][45] Authoritarian rule entails a balancing act whereby the ruler has to maintain the support of other elites (frequently through the distribution of state and societal resources) and the support of the public (through distribution of the same resources): the authoritarian rule is at risk if the balancing act is lopsided, as it risks a coup by the elites or an uprising by the mass public.[46][47]
Manipulation of information
According to a 2019 study by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, authoritarian regimes have over time become less reliant on violence and mass repression to maintain control. The study shows instead that authoritarians have increasingly resorted to manipulation of information as a means of control. Authoritarians increasingly seek to create an appearance of good performance, conceal state repression, and imitate democracy.[48]
Systemic weakness and resilience
Andrew J. Nathan notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, over-centralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. ... Few authoritarian regimes – be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist – have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions."[49]
Political scientist Theodore M. Vestal writes that authoritarian political systems may be weakened through inadequate responsiveness to either popular or elite demands and that the authoritarian tendency to respond to challenges by exerting tighter control, instead of by adapting, may compromise the legitimacy of an authoritarian state and lead to its collapse.[19]
One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors such as (1) "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; (2) "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; (3) "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and (4) "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large."[49]
Violence
Yale University political scientist Milan Svolik argues that violence is a common characteristic of authoritarian systems. Violence tends to be common in authoritarian states because of a lack of independent third parties empowered to settle disputes between the dictator, regime allies, regime soldiers and the masses.[44]
Authoritarians may resort to measures referred to as coup-proofing (structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power). Coup-proofing strategies include strategically placing family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creating of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and developing multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.[50] Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring[51][52] and reduce the likelihood of mass protests.[53] However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,[54][55][56][57] and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.[58] A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.[59] Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting.[59] According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.[60] A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.[61] A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.[62] A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler."[63]
According to a 2019 study, personalist dictatorships are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship.[64]
Typologies
According to Yale professor Juan José Linz there a three main types of political regimes today: democracies, totalitarian regimes and, sitting between these two, authoritarian regimes (with hybrid regimes).[65][66]
Similar terms
- An authoritarian regime has "a concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people".[67] Unlike totalitarian states, they will allow social and economic institutions not under governmental control,[68] and tend to rely on passive mass acceptance rather than active popular support.[69]
- An Autocracy is a state/government in which one person possesses "unlimited power".
- A Totalitarian state is "based on subordination of the individual to the state and strict control of all aspects of the life and productive capacity of the nation especially by coercive measures (such as censorship and terrorism)".[70] and are ruled by a single ruling party made up of loyal supporters.[71] Unlike autocracies, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition",[72] totalitarian states are characterized by an official ideology, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition",[72] and "seek to dominate every aspect of everyone's life as a prelude to world domination".[72]
- A Fascist state is autocratic and based on a political philosophy/movement, (such as that of the Fascisti of pre-WWII Italy) "that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition".[73]
Subtypes
Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others.[74] Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:
- Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling
authority (generally a single person)" is maintained in power "through a
combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patron-client ties and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties." An example is Ethiopia under Haile Selassie I.[74]
- Honoring South Korean President Park Chung-hee in Army Parade at Armed Forces Day on 1 October 1973
- Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are those "governed by a coalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically (rather than ideologically) within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality."[74] Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" such South Korea under Park Chung-hee.[74]
According to Barbara Geddes, there are seven typologies of authoritarian regimes: dominant party regimes, military regime, personalist regimes, monarchies, oligarchic regimes, indirect military regimes, or hybrids of the first three.[75]
Subtypes of authoritarian regimes identified by Linz are corporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy" and post-totalitarian.[74]
- Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatism institutions are used extensively by the state to coopt and demobilize powerful interest groups." This type has been studied most extensively in Latin America.[74]
- Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democratic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights", such as in South Africa under apartheid.[74]
- Post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes are those in which totalitarian institutions (such as the party, secret police and state-controlled mass media[76]) remain, but where "ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state's top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially."[74] Examples include the Russian Federation and Soviet Eastern Bloc states in the mid-1980s.[74] The post-Mao Zedong People's Republic of China was viewed as post-totalitarian in the 1990s and early 2000s, with a limited degree of increase in pluralism and civil society.[77][78] however, in the 2010s, particularly after Xi Jinping succeeded as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and rose to power in 2012, Chinese state repression sharply increased, aided by digital control and mass surveillance.[79][80][81]
Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are personalistic or populist.[74] Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule and authority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules."[74] Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups."[74] Examples include Argentina under Juan Perón,[74] Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser[74] and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.[82][83]
A typology of authoritarian regimes by political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater includes four categories:
- machine (oligarchic party dictatorships);
- bossism (autocratic party dictatorships);
- juntas (oligarchic military dictatorships); and
- strongman (autocratic military dictatorships).[4]
Lai and Slater argue that single‐party regimes are better than military regimes at developing institutions (e.g. mass mobilization, patronage networks ad coordination of elites) that are effective at continuing the regime's incumbency and diminishing domestic challengers; Lai and Slater also argue that military regimes more often initiate military conflicts or undertake other "desperate measures" to maintain control as compared to single‐party regimes.[4][3]
John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition to individualism.[84] Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations and conformities.[85]
According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, authoritarian regimes that are created in social revolutions are far more durable than other kinds of authoritarian regimes.[86]
Authoritarianism and democracy
Authoritarianism and democracy are not necessarily fundamental opposites and may be thought of as poles at opposite ends of a scale, so that it is possible for some democracies to possess authoritarian elements, and for an authoritarian system to have democratic elements.[88][89][90] Authoritarian regimes may also be partly responsive to citizen grievances, although this is generally only regarding grievances that do not undermine the stability of the regime.[91][92] An illiberal democracy, or procedural democracy, is distinguished from liberal democracy, or substantive democracy, in that illiberal democracies lack features such as the rule of law, protections for minority groups, an independent judiciary and the real separation of powers.[93][94][95][96]
A further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars (sometimes called militarized interstate disputes) causing fewer battle deaths with one another and that democracies have far fewer civil wars.[97][98]
Research shows that the democratic nations have much less democide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies.[99] Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption.[100]
A 2006 study by economist Alberto Abadie has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least terrorism are the most and least democratic nations, and that "transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism."[101] Studies in 2013 and 2017 similarly found a nonlinear relationship between political freedom and terrorism, with the most terrorist attacks occurring in partial democracies and the fewest in "strict autocracies and full-fledged democracies."[102] A 2018 study by Amichai Magen demonstrated that liberal democracies and polyarchies not only suffer fewer terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, but also suffer fewer casualties in terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, which may be attributed to higher-quality democracies' responsiveness to their citizens' demands, including "the desire for physical safety", resulting in "investment in intelligence, infrastructure protection, first responders, social resilience, and specialized medical care" which averts casualties.[102] Magen also stated that terrorism in closed autocracies sharply increased starting in 2013.[102]
Within national democratic governments, there may be subnational authoritarian enclaves. A prominent examples of this includes the Southern United States after Reconstruction, as well as areas of contemporary Argentina and Mexico.[103]
Competitive authoritarian regimes
Another type of authoritarian regime is the competitive authoritarian regime, a type of civilian regime that arose in the post-Cold War era. In a competitive authoritarian regime, "formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but ... incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents."[104][105] The term was coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their 2010 book of the same name to discuss a type of hybrid regime that emerged during and after the Cold War.[104][106]
Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian regimes in that elections are regularly held, the opposition can openly operate without a high risk of exile or imprisonment and "democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power."[104] Competitive authoritarian regimes lack one or more of the three characteristics of democracies such as free elections (i.e. elections untainted by substantial fraud or voter intimidation); protection of civil liberties (i.e. the freedom of speech, press and association) and an even playing field (in terms of access to resources, the media and legal recourse).[107]
Authoritarianism and fascism
Authoritarianism is considered a core concept of fascism[108][109][110][111] and scholars agree that a fascist regime is foremost an authoritarian form of government, although not all authoritarian regimes are fascist. While authoritarianism is a defining characteristic of fascism, scholars argue that more distinguishing traits are needed to make an authoritarian regime fascist.[112][113][114][115][116][117][118][119][120]
Authoritarianism and totalitarianism
Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, the Catholic Church, Falange, monarchists, technocrats and others). Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support.[69] According to Juan Linz the distinction between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian one is that an authoritarian regime seeks to suffocate politics and political mobilization while totalitarianism seeks to control and utilize them.[65] Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:[68]
|
|
Totalitarianism | Authoritarianism |
|---|---|---|
| Charisma | High | Low |
| Role conception | Leader as function | Leader as individual |
| Ends of power | Public | Private |
| Corruption | Low | High |
| Official ideology | Yes | No |
| Limited pluralism | No | Yes |
| Legitimacy | Yes | No |
Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms of autocracy, they differ in three key dichotomies:
(1) Unlike their bland and generally unpopular authoritarian brethren, totalitarian dictators develop a charismatic "mystique" and a mass-based, pseudo-democratic interdependence with their followers via the conscious manipulation of a prophetic image.
(2) Concomitant role conceptions differentiate totalitarians from authoritarians. Authoritarians view themselves as individual beings largely content to control and often maintain the status quo. Totalitarian self-conceptions are largely teleological. The tyrant is less a person than an indispensable function to guide and reshape the universe.
(3) Consequently, the utilisation of power for personal aggrandizement is more evident among authoritarians than totalitarians. Lacking the binding appeal of ideology, authoritarians support their rule by a mixture of instilling fear and granting rewards to loyal collaborators, engendering a kleptocracy.[68]
Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invades private life and asphyxiates it."[123] Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature."[123] Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of ... industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.[123]
Greg Yudin, a professor of political philosophy at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, argues "political passivity and civic disengagement" are "key features" of authoritarianism, while totalitarianism relies on "mass mobilization, terror and homogeneity of beliefs".[124]
Economic effects
The effects of political regime types on economic growth have been debated by scholars. A 1993 assessment of existing scholarship led Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi to conclude, "we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth."[125] In 2010, Dani Rodrik wrote that democracies outperform autocracies in terms of long-term economic growth, economic stability, adjustments to external economic shocks, human capital investment, and economic equality.[126] A 2019 study by Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson found that democracy increases GDP per capita by about 20 percent over the long-term.[127] According to Amartya Sen, no functioning liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scale famine.[128]
Scholars have identified that autocracies may have an advantage when it comes to rapid industrialization.[129] Seymour Martin Lipset argued that low-income authoritarian regimes have certain technocratic "efficiency-enhancing advantages" over low-income democracies that gives authoritarian regimes an advantage in economic development.[130] By contrast, Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein (2005) argue that democracies "realize superior development performance" over authoritarianism, pointing out that poor democracies are more likely to have steadier economic growth and less likely to experience economic and humanitarian catastrophes (such as refugee crises) than authoritarian regimes; that civil liberties in democracies act as a curb on corruption and misuse of resources; and that democracies are more adaptable than authoritarian regimes.[130]
Studies suggest that several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, size of the public sector or income inequality.[131]
Historical trends
Post-World War II anti-authoritarianism
Both World War II (ending in 1945) and the Cold War (ending in 1991) resulted in the replacement of authoritarian regimes by either democratic regimes or regimes that were less authoritarian.
World War II saw the defeat of the Axis powers by the Allied powers. All the Axis powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan) had totalitarian or authoritarian governments, and two of the three were replaced by governments based on democratic constitutions. The Allied powers were an alliance of Democratic states and (later) the Communist Soviet Union. At least in Western Europe the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and Nazism was denigrated. The new Federal Republic of Germany banned its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, the new constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteen Länder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government, at least not at first.[132]
Culturally there was also a strong sense of anti-authoritarianism based on anti-fascism in Western Europe. This was attributed to the active resistance from occupation and to fears arising from the development of superpowers.[133] Anti-authoritarianism also became associated with countercultural and bohemian movements such as the Beat Generation in the 1950s,[134] the hippies in the 1960s[135] and punks in the 1970s.[136]
In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay moved away from dictatorships to democracy between 1982 and 1990.[137]
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of World War II collapsed. This led not so much to revolt against authority in general, but to the belief that authoritarian states (and state control of economies) were outdated.[138] The idea that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed"[139] became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated in Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History and the Last Man.[139] According to Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving towards democracy in the early 1990s" as were the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans.[140]
In December 2010, the Arab Spring arose in response to unrest over economic stagnation but also in opposition to oppressive authoritarian regimes, first in Tunisia, and spreading to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere. Regimes were toppled in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and partially in Yemen while other countries saw riots, civil wars or insurgencies. Most Arab Spring revolutions failed to lead to enduring democratization. In the decade following the Arab Spring, of the countries in which an autocracy was toppled in the Arab spring, only Tunisia had become a genuine democracy; Egypt backslid to return to a military-run authoritarian state, while Libya, Syria and Yemen experienced devastating civil wars.[141][142]
2000s authoritarian revival
Since 2005, observers noted what some have called a "democratic recession",[139][143] although some such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have disputed that there was a significant democratic decline before 2013.[143] In 2018, the Freedom House declared that from 2006 to 2018 "113 countries" around the world showed "a net decline" in "political rights and civil liberties" while "only 62" experienced "a net improvement."[144] Its 2020 report marked the fourteenth consecutive year of declining scores.[145] By 2020, all countries marked as "not free" by Freedom House had also developed practices of transnational authoritarianism, aiming to police and control dissent beyond state borders.[146]
|
|
countries becoming more democratic |
countries becoming more authoritarian |
|---|---|---|
| late 1990s | 72 | 3 |
| 2021 | 15 | 33 |
| source: V-Dem[147][148] | ||
Writing in 2018, American political journalist David Frum stated: "The hopeful world of the very late 20th century – the world of NAFTA and an expanding NATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such as Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela – now looks battered and delusive."[149]
Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment"[139] and Fukuyama himself expressed concern.[138] By 2018, only one Arab Spring uprising (that in Tunisia) resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance[150] and a "resurgence of authoritarianism and Islamic extremism" in the region[151] was dubbed the Arab Winter.[152][153][154][155][156]
Various explanations have been offered for the new spread of authoritarianism. They include the downside of globalization, and the subsequent rise of populist neo-nationalism,[157] and the success of the Beijing Consensus, i.e. the authoritarian model of the People's Republic of China.[158] In countries such as the United States, factors blamed for the growth of authoritarianism include the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and slower real wage growth[159] as well as social media's elimination of so-called "gatekeepers" of knowledge – the equivalent of disintermediation in economics – so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts" – including everything from the danger of global warming to the preventing the spread of disease through vaccination – and considers to be fact what are actually only unproven fringe opinions.[160]
In United States politics, the terms "extreme right", "far-right", and "ultra-right" are labels used to describe "militant forms of insurgent revolutionary right ideology and separatist ethnocentric nationalism",[161] such as Christian Identity,[161] the Creativity Movement,[161] the Ku Klux Klan,[161] the National Socialist Movement,[161][162][163] the National Alliance,[161] the Joy of Satan Ministries,[162][163] and the Order of Nine Angles.[164] These far-right groups share conspiracist views of power which are overwhelmingly anti-Semitic and reject pluralist democracy in favour of an organic oligarchy that would unite the perceived homogeneously racial Völkish nation.[161][164] The far-right in the United States is composed of various Neo-fascist, Neo-Nazi, White nationalist, and White supremacist organizations and networks who have been known to refer to an "acceleration" of racial conflict through violent means such as assassinations, murders, terrorist attacks, and societal collapse, in order to achieve the building of a White ethnostate.[164]
Examples
There is no one consensus definition of authoritarianism, but several annual measurements are attempted, including Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World report. Some countries such as Venezuela, among others, that are currently or historically recognized as authoritarian did not become authoritarian upon taking power or fluctuated between an authoritarian, flawed, and Hybrid regime due to periods of democratic backsliding and/or democratization. The time period reflects their time in power rather than the years they were authoritarian regimes. Some countries such as China and fascist regimes have also been characterized as totalitarian, with some periods being depicted as more authoritarian, or totalitarian, than others.
Current
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which are currently or frequently characterized as authoritarian and/or democratically backsliding. Some countries listed may also be currently listed as a "Hybrid regime" or "flawed democracy" by Democracy Index (The Economist), or partly free by Freedom House's Freedom in the World index or reach a low score at V-Dem Democracy indices.
| State | Time period | Ruling group or person | Notes and references | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Afghanistan
|
1996–2001; 2021– | Taliban | Totalitarian state;[165] returned to power in 2021 | |
 Angola
|
1975– | People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola | [166] | |
 Azerbaijan
|
1993– | New Azerbaijan Party | [167] | |
 Bahrain
|
1783– | House of Khalifa | [168] | |
 Bangladesh
|
2009- | Awami League, under Sheikh Hasina |
| |
 Belarus
|
1994– | Alexander Lukashenko | [169][170][171][172][173] | |
 Burundi
|
2005– | CNDD–FDD | [174] | |
 Cambodia
|
1979– | Cambodian People's Party | [175][176] | |
 Cameroon
|
1982– | Paul Biya | [177][178] | |
 Chad
|
1990– | Déby Family | Idriss Déby was Killed in action by insurgents after 30 years of uninterrupted presidency[179] His son Mahamat Déby heads the government | |
 People's Republic of China
|
1949– | Chinese Communist Party | Some scholars have deemed the Chinese system "a fragmented authoritarianism" (Lieberthal), "a negotiated state", or "a consultative authoritarian regime."[180] According to research by John Kennedy et al. (2018), Chinese citizens with higher education tend to participate less in local elections and have lower levels of democratic values when compared to those with only compulsory education.[181] | |
 Republic of the Congo
|
1969–1992; 1997- | Congolese Party of Labour | [182] | |
 Cuba
|
1959– | Communist Party of Cuba | [183] | |
 Djibouti
|
1977– | Hassan Gouled Aptidon and Ismaïl Omar Guelleh | [184][185] | |
 Egypt
|
2014– | Abdel Fattah el-Sisi | [186] | |
 El Salvador
|
2019– | Nayib Bukele | [187][188] | |
 Equatorial Guinea
|
1979– | Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo | [189] | |
 Eritrea
|
1993–[190] | Isaias Afwerki | Eritrea is considered a totalitarian dictatorship who has never organized presidential elections despite the rise of multipartyism in the 1990s.[191] | |
 Gabon
|
1961– | Gabonese Democratic Party | [192] | |
 Hungary
|
2010– | Fidesz, under Viktor Orbán | It has recently moved more towards illiberalism.[193][194][195][196] | |
 India*
|
2014– | Narendra Modi | Some scholars and think tanks have argued that the country is democratically backsliding.Though it is has been subject to debate.[197][198][199] | |
 Iran
|
1979– | Islamic Republic of Iran | After the Iranian Revolution, Iran became an authoritarian clerical state (nominally an "Islamic republic") based on the absolute authority of the unelected Supreme Leader of Iran, based on the Shia concept of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.[200][201] In 2000, Juan José Linz wrote that "it is difficult to fit the Iranian regime into the existing typology, as it combines the ideological bent of totalitarianism with the limited pluralism of authoritarianism and holds regular elections in which candidates advocating differing policies and incumbents are often defeated."[202] | |
 Israel
|
1996-1999; 2007-2021; 2022- | Benjamin Netanyahu | During his term he is accused of creating an ultranationalist government,repealing rights to Palestinians and banning flags of enemy countries. | |
 Jordan
|
1946– | Hashemites | [203] | |
 Kazakhstan
|
1990– | Nur Otan | [177] | |
 Laos
|
1975– | Lao People's Revolutionary Party | [204] | |
 Morocco
|
1957– | Alaouite dynasty | [203][205][206] | |
 Mozambique
|
1975– | FRELIMO | [207] | |
 Myanmar
|
1962– | Tatmadaw | The Tatmadaw allowed a democratically-elected administration to exercise some power from 2016 to 2021, without allowing civilian control of the military.[208] | |
 Nicaragua
|
1979–1990; 2007– | Daniel Ortega | [209][210] | |
 North Korea
|
1949– | Workers' Party of Korea and Kim Dynasty |
| |
 Oman
|
1970– | House of Al Said | Began with the 1970 coup d'état.[211] | |
 Palestine
|
1964– | Palestine Liberation Organization | [212] | |
 Poland
|
2015– | Law and Justice | It has recently moved towards illiberalism.[193][194][213][214][215][216][217][218] | |
 Qatar
|
1971– | House of Thani | [219] | |
 Russia
|
2000– | Vladimir Putin | [220][221][222] | |
 Rwanda
|
2000– | Paul Kagame | [223] | |
 First Saudi State
|
1744–1818 | House of Saud | [224] | |
| Second Saudi State
|
1824–1891 | |||
 Saudi Arabia
|
1902– | |||
 Serbia
|
2012– | Serbian Progressive Party, under Aleksandar Vučić | [225][226][227][228] | |
 Singapore
|
1965– | People's Action Party | [229][230] | |
 South Sudan
|
2011– | Sudan People's Liberation Movement, under Salva Kiir Mayardit | [231] | |
 Republika Srpska(part of  Bosnia and Herzegovina)
|
2006– | Milorad Dodik | [232][233][234] | |
 Syria
|
1963– | Ba'athist regime and al-Assad family | [235] | |
 Tajikistan
|
1994– | Emomali Rahmon | [236] | |
 Thailand
|
2014– | Prayut Chan-o-cha | The 2014 Thai coup d'état overthrew the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra in a military coup and installed a military junta to oversee the governance of Thailand.[237] | |
 Togo
|
1967– | Eyadema Family |
| |
 Turkey
|
2003– | Justice and Development Party, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan | It has been described by observers as a "competitive authoritarian regime."[238] | |
 Turkmenistan
|
1990– | Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, under Saparmurat Niyazov (1991-2006), Berdimuhamedow family (2007–present) | Turkmenistan is effectively a totalitarian hereditary dictatorship.[239][240] | |
 United Arab Emirates
|
1971– | Royal families of the United Arab Emirates | [241][242] | |
 Uganda
|
1986– | Yoweri Museveni | There are rumors that his son will succeed Museveni in the 2026 Ugandan presidential election. | [243] |
 Uzbekistan
|
1989– | Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party | [244][245][246] | |
 Venezuela
|
1999– | United Socialist Party of Venezuela, under Hugo Chávez until death, followed by Nicolás Maduro | [247] | |
 Vietnam
|
1976– | Vietnamese Communist Party | [248] | |
 Zimbabwe
|
1980– | ZANU-PF | [249][250] |
Historical
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which were historically authoritarian.
| State | Time period | Ruling group or person | Notes and references |
|---|---|---|---|
 Algeria[251]
|
1999–2019 | Abdelaziz Bouteflika |
|
 Argentina[252][253]
|
1946–1955 | Justicialist Party rule of Juan Perón | See also Peronism, populist authoritarianism. |
| 1966–1973 | Military government | See the Argentine Revolution for period of military rule. | |
| 1973–1976 | Justicialist Party rule of Juan and Isabel Perón |
| |
| 1976–1983 | Free trade and deregulatory rule of Jorge Rafael Videla | See also the National Reorganization Process, period of military rule. | |
 Austria
|
1933–1938 | Christian Social Party under Engelbert Dollfuß and Fatherland Front under Kurt Schuschnigg | See also the Federal State of Austria and Ständestaat. |
 Brazil[254]
|
1937–1945 | Getúlio Vargas | See also the Vargas Era. |
| 1964–1985 | Military dictatorship in Brazil | It started with the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état. | |
 Burma[255]
|
1962–2011 | Military government and the Burma Socialist Programme Party | It started with the 1962 Burmese coup d'état and ended with the 2011–2012 Burmese political reforms. |
| Burundi
|
1961–1993 | UPRONA |
|
 Confederate States of America
|
1861–1865 | Jefferson Davis | Considered as an authoritarian[256] herrenvolk republic, where the Confederacy was a "democracy of the white race."[257] |
| Chad
|
1982-1990 | Hissène Habré | Habré he was derrocated by Idriss Déby,he was tried in Senegal for crimes against his country and died in prison months after the man who removed him from power died in combat |
 Chile[258]
|
1973–1990 | Augusto Pinochet | It started with the CIA-backed 1973 Chilean coup d'état, which overthrew the democratically elected government of democratic socialist Salvador Allende. |
 Republic of China
|
1927–1949 | Kuomintang and Nationalist government (Chiang Kai-shek) | The Republic of China on Taiwan is listed further below. |
 Democratic Republic of the Congo
|
1997–2019 | Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila | [259] Zaïre is listed further below. |
 Croatia[260][261]
|
1990–1999 | Franjo Tuđman |
|
 Czechoslovakia
|
1938–1939 | Party of National Unity |
|
| Egypt[262]
|
1952–2011 | Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak |
|
| Equatorial Guinea
|
1968–1979 | Francisco Macias Nguema |
|
 Ethiopia
|
1974–1991 | Mengistu Haile Mariam and the Workers' Party of Ethiopia | [263] |
| Ethiopia
|
1991–2019 | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front | [264] |
 Fiji
|
2006–2014 | FijiFirst[a] | [265][266][267][268] |
 Gambia
|
1994–2017 | Yahya Jammeh | Jammeh is overthrown by democratic elections and is forced to resign |
 Nazi Germany
|
1933–1945 | Adolf Hitler | See also Nazism. |
 Guinea
|
1958–2021 | Ahmed Sekou Touré, Lansana Conté, Moussa Dadis Camara and Alpha Condé | Guinea was marked by a series of authoritarian generations. |
 Guinea-Bissau
|
1980–1999 | Joao Bernardo Vieira | Nino Vieira would govern in an authoritarian manner in the 80s and 90s until his overthrow, in 2005 he returned to the presidency until his assassination. |
 Hungary[269]
|
1920–1944 | Miklós Horthy and the Unity Party |
|
 Indonesia
|
1959–1998 | Sukarno and Suharto | See also the Guided Democracy era and the New Order |
 Iran
|
1925–1979 | Pahlavi dynasty | [270] |
 Iraq
|
1968–2003 | Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein |
|
 Liberia
|
1886–1980 | True Whig Party | Party that ruled Liberia for more than 100 years and the monopoly was overthrown by the 1980 Liberian coup. |
| 1980–1990 | Samuel Doe | The Liberian president ends up captured and executed for a long time in the middle of a Civil war. | |
 Fascist Italy
|
1922–1943 | Benito Mussolini | [271] |
 Libya[272]
|
1969–2011 | Muammar Gaddafi | It started with the 1969 Libyan coup d'état and ended with the 2011 Libyan Civil War. |
 Lithuania[273]
|
1926–1940 | Antanas Smetona | See also the 1940 Soviet ultimatum to Lithuania. |
 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[274][275]
|
2006–2016 | Nikola Gruevski |
|
 Malaysia
|
1957–2018 | United Malays National Organisation | See also the 1988 Malaysian constitutional crisis. |
 Mali
|
1968–1991 | Moussa Traoré | Moussa is deposed in the 1991 Malian coup d'état and sentenced to death twice, exonerated in May 2002. |
| Massachusetts Bay Colony | 1630-1691 | John Winthrop | Established authoritarian government.[276][277] |
 Mexico
|
1833–1855 | Santa Anna | See also Antonio López de Santa Anna. |
| 1876–1911 | Porfirio Díaz, Juan Méndez, and Manuel Flores. | See also Porfiriato. | |
| 1929–2000 | PRI | Mexico was very authoritarian when PRI was the ruling party in Mexico but in 2000 after about 70 years of ruling they lost the 2000 Mexican presidential election. They eventually came back to power in 2012 by winning the Mexican presidential election but eventually lost power in the 2018 Mexican presidential election as their candidate finished 3rd. See also Tlatelolco massacre and the rigged 1988 Mexican presidential election. | |
 Ottoman Empire
|
1878–1908 | Abdul Hamid II |
|
| 1913–1918 | The Three Pashas |
| |
 Montenegro
|
1990–2023 | Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro, under Milo Đukanović | [278][279][280][281][282] |
| Nicaragua
|
1936–1979 | Somoza Family | The Somoza clan loses power in the Sandinista revolution. |
 Philippines
|
1965–1986 | Ferdinand Marcos | It ended with the People Power Revolution. |
 Poland
|
1926–1939 | Sanation | See also the May Coup. |
 Portugal[283]
|
1926–1933 | Military government | See the National Dictatorship. |
| 1933–1974 | Estado Novo regime under António de Oliveira Salazar and Marcelo Caetano | It ended with the Carnation Revolution. | |
 Rwanda
|
1961–1994 | Gregoire Kayibanda and Juvenal Habyarimana |
|
 Somalia
|
1969–1991 | Siad Barre |
|
 South Africa[284][285]
|
1948–1994 | National Party | It ended with the end of apartheid. |
 South Korea[286][287]
|
1948–1960 | Syngman Rhee |
|
| 1961–1987 | Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan |
| |
 Francoist Spain[288]
|
1936–1978 | Spanish State under Francisco Franco and Juan Carlos I of Spain | Until the Spanish transition to democracy. |
 Sudan[177]
|
1969–2019 | Jaafar Nimeiry and Omar al-Bashir | Ousted in 2019 sudanese coup d'etat |
| Taiwan[289]
|
1945–1987 | Kuomintang (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo) | The Republic of China (1927–1949) is listed further above. |
 Tunisia
|
1987–2011 | Zine El Abidine Ben Ali | See also Tunisian Revolution |
| Turkey[290][291]
|
1923–1950 | Republican People's Party |
|
 Soviet Union
|
1922–1991 | Communist Party of the Soviet Union | See also authoritarian socialism. |
 Ukraine
|
1992—2005 | Leonid Kuchma | Many View Kuchma's Regime As Oppressive Or Authoritarian. Ended In The Orange Revolution. |
 Kingdom of Yugoslavia
|
1929–1934 | Under Alexander I and the JRSD | See also the 6 January Dictatorship. |
| 1934–1941 | Under Milan Stojadinović and the JRZ |
| |
 SFR Yugoslavia[292][293]
|
1944–1980 | Under Josip Broz Tito | See also the death and state funeral of Josip Broz Tito. |
 FR Yugoslavia[294][295]
|
1992–2000 | Under Slobodan Milošević | See also the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević. |
 Zaïre
|
1965–1997 | Mobutu Sese Seko | [259] The Democratic Republic of the Congo after 1997 is listed above. |
See also
References
Informational notes
- While FijiFirst's leader, Frank Bainimarama, still forms government in Fiji, democratic elections were held again in 2014 after eight years without elections following the 2006 Fijian coup d'état.
Citations
Political scientists have outlined elaborated typologies of authoritarianism, from which it is not easy to draw a generally accepted definition; it seems that its main features are the non-acceptance of conflict and plurality as normal elements of politics, the will to preserve the status quo and prevent change by keeping all political dynamics under close control by a strong central power, and lastly, the erosion of the rule of law, the division of powers, and democratic voting procedures.
I follow Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix (2003), and Cheibub et al. (2010) in defining a dictatorship as an independent country that fails to satisfy at least one of the following two criteria for democracy: (1) free and competitive legislative elections and (2) an executive that is elected either directly in free and competitive presidential elections or indirectly by a legislature in parliamentary systems. Throughout this book, I use the terms dictatorship and authoritarian regime interchangeably and refer to the heads of these regimes' governments as simply dictators or authoritarian leaders, regardless of their formal title.
More demanding criteria may require that governments respect certain civil liberties – such as the freedom of religion (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Zakaria 1997) – or that the incumbent government and the opposition alternate in power at least once after the first seemingly free election (Huntington 1993; Przeworski et al. 2000; Cheibib et al. 2010).
• Zaitchik, Alexander (19 October 2006). "The National Socialist Movement Implodes". SPLCenter.org. Montgomery, Alabama: Southern Poverty Law Center. Archived from the original on 19 September 2015. Retrieved 28 December 2020.
The party's problems began last June, when Citizens Against Hate discovered that NSM's Tulsa post office box was shared by The Joy of Satan Ministry, in which the wife of NSM chairman emeritus Clifford Herrington is High Priestess. [...] Within NSM ranks, meanwhile, a bitter debate was sparked over the propriety of Herrington's Joy of Satan connections. [...] Schoep moved ahead with damage-control operations by nudging chairman emeritus Herrington from his position under the cover of "attending to personal matters." But it was too late to stop NSM Minister of Radio and Information Michael Blevins, aka Vonbluvens, from following White out of the party, citing disgust with Herrington's Joy of Satan ties. "Satanism," declared Blevins in his resignation letter, "affects the whole prime directive guiding the [NSM] – SURVIVAL OF THE WHITE RACE." [...] NSM was now a Noticeably Smaller Movement, one trailed in extremist circles by a strong whiff of Satanism and related charges of sexual impropriety associated with Joy of Satan initiation rites and curiously strong teen recruitment efforts.
• "National Socialist Movement". SPLCenter.org. Montgomery, Alabama: Southern Poverty Law Center. 2020. Archived from the original on 8 September 2015. Retrieved 28 December 2020.
The NSM has had its share of movement scandal. In July 2006, it was rocked by revelations that co-founder and chairman emeritus Cliff Herrington's wife was the "High Priestess" of the Joy of Satan Ministry, and that her satanic church shared an address with the Tulsa, Okla., NSM chapter. The exposure of Herrington's wife's Satanist connections caused quite a stir, particularly among those NSM members who adhered to a racist (and heretical) variant of Christianity, Christian Identity. Before the dust settled, both Herringtons were forced out of NSM. Bill White, the neo-Nazi group's energetic spokesman, also quit, taking several NSM officials with him to create a new group, the American National Socialist Workers Party.
- Sakhi, Nilofar (December 2022). "The Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan and Security Paradox". Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs. 9 (3): 383–401. doi:10.1177/23477970221130882. S2CID 253945821.
Afghanistan is now controlled by a militant group that operates out of a totalitarian ideology.
- Madadi, Sayed (6 September 2022). "Dysfunctional centralization and growing fragility under Taliban rule". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 28 November 2022.
In other words, the centralized political and governance institutions of the former republic were unaccountable enough that they now comfortably accommodate the totalitarian objectives of the Taliban without giving the people any chance to resist peacefully.
- Sadr, Omar (23 March 2022). "Afghanistan's Public Intellectuals Fail to Denounce the Taliban". Fair Observer. Retrieved 28 November 2022.
The Taliban government currently installed in Afghanistan is not simply another dictatorship. By all standards, it is a totalitarian regime.
- "Dismantlement of the Taliban regime is the only way forward for Afghanistan". Atlantic Council. 8 September 2022. Retrieved 28 November 2022.
As with any other ideological movement, the Taliban's Islamic government is transformative and totalitarian in nature.
- Akbari, Farkhondeh (7 March 2022). "The Risks Facing Hazaras in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan". George Washington University. Retrieved 28 November 2022.
In the Taliban's totalitarian Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, there is no meaningful political inclusivity or representation for Hazaras at any level.
Over the past several years, Azerbaijan has become increasingly authoritarian, as the authorities have used tactics such as harassment, intimidation, blackmail, attack and imprisonment to silence the regime's critics, whether journalists, bloggers, human rights defenders, political activists or ordinary people taking to the streets in protest.
...German Foreign Minister's branding him 'Europe's last dictator'
..an authoritarian ruling style is characteristic of me [Lukashenko]
...The slaveholding elites' project of Confederate nation building... the idea that the Confederacy was a "herrenvolk democracy" or "democracy of the white race"
- Pribićević. "Serbia – From Authoritarian Regime to Democracy." Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies. Project MUSE.
Bibliography
- Linz, Juan J. (1964). "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain". In Allard, Eric; Littunen, Yrjo. Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems. Helsinki: Academic Bookstore.
Further reading
- Frantz; Erica; Geddes, Barbara; Wrights, Joseph (2018). How Dictatorships Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781316336182.
External links
Quotations related to Authoritarianism at Wikiquote
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authoritarianism
Autocracy is a system of government in which absolute power over a state is concentrated in the hands of one person, whose decisions are subject neither to external legal restraints nor to regularized mechanisms of popular control (except perhaps for the implicit threat of a coup d'état or other forms of rebellion).[1]
In earlier times, the term autocrat was coined as a favorable description of a ruler, having some connection to the concept of "lack of conflicts of interests" as well as an indication of grandeur and power. This use of the term continued into modern times, as the Russian emperor was styled "Autocrat of all the Russias" as late as the early 20th century. In the 19th century, Eastern and Central Europe were under autocratic monarchies within the territories of which lived diverse peoples.
Autocracy is the most common and durable regime type since the emergence of the state.[2]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autocracy
Adhocracy is a flexible, adaptable and informal form of organization that is defined by a lack of formal structure that employs specialized multidisciplinary teams grouped by functions. It operates in an opposite fashion to a bureaucracy.[1] The term was coined by Warren Bennis in his 1968 book The Temporary Society,[2] later popularized in 1970 by Alvin Toffler in Future Shock, and has since become often used in the theory of management of organizations (particularly online organizations[3]). The concept has been further developed by academics such as Henry Mintzberg.
Adhocracy is characterized by an adaptive, creative and flexible integrative behavior based on non-permanence and spontaneity. It is believed that these characteristics allow adhocracy to respond faster than traditional bureaucratic organizations while being more open to new ideas.[4]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adhocracy
The page "Ad hoc fallacy" does not exist. You can create a draft and submit it for review, but consider checking the search results below to see whether the topic is already covered.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc (Latin: 'after this, therefore because of this') is an informal fallacy that states: "Since event Y followed event X, event Y... 5 KB (609 words) - 21:38, 24 April 2023 |
No true Scotsman (redirect from Logical fallacy/No true Scotsman) explains the fallacy as an "ad hoc rescue" of a refuted generalization attempt. The following is a simplified rendition of the fallacy: Person A: "No... 8 KB (933 words) - 04:15, 22 May 2023 |
Correlation does not imply causation (redirect from Cum hoc ergo propter hoc) phrase cum hoc ergo propter hoc ('with this, therefore because of this'). This differs from the fallacy known as post hoc ergo propter hoc ("after this... 38 KB (4,760 words) - 22:01, 8 April 2023 |
fallacy of the mean, argumentum ad temperantiam) – assuming that a compromise between two positions is always correct. Continuum fallacy (fallacy of... 66 KB (6,948 words) - 10:12, 20 May 2023 |
 | science and philosophy, an ad hoc hypothesis is a hypothesis added to a theory in order to save it from being falsified. Often, ad hoc hypothesizing is employed... 3 KB (257 words) - 16:14, 21 March 2023 |
called argument to logic (argumentum ad logicam), the fallacy fallacy, the fallacist's fallacy, and the bad reasons fallacy. It has the general argument form:... 6 KB (725 words) - 20:00, 16 March 2023 |
demonstrating how the objection fit these terms. It is similar to the ad lapidem fallacy, in which the person rejects all the evidence and logic presented... 4 KB (402 words) - 00:08, 12 May 2023 |
Questionable cause (redirect from Fallacy of false cause) Third-cause fallacy Wrong direction Fallacy of the single cause Post hoc ergo propter hoc Regression fallacy Texas sharpshooter fallacy Jumping to conclusions... 1 KB (132 words) - 15:20, 12 March 2023 |
categorized among informal fallacies, more precisely as a genetic fallacy, a subcategory of fallacies of irrelevance. Ad hominem fallacies can be separated in... 21 KB (2,779 words) - 14:53, 21 May 2023 |
The fallacy of composition is an informal fallacy that arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some... 7 KB (1,054 words) - 16:14, 22 January 2023 |
Argumentum ad populum is a type of informal fallacy, specifically a fallacy of relevance, and is similar to an argument from authority (argumentum ad verecundiam)... 15 KB (1,619 words) - 17:22, 22 April 2023 |
observed Post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this), a logical fallacy of causation "Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc" (The West Wing)... 1 KB (167 words) - 17:20, 3 July 2021 |
Correlative-based fallacies – Informal fallacies based on correlative conjunctions Cum hoc ergo propter hoc – Refutation of a logical fallacyPages displaying... 8 KB (956 words) - 21:37, 22 April 2023 |
Appeal to the stone (redirect from Ad lapidem fallacy) Appeal to the stone, also known as argumentum ad lapidem, is a logical fallacy that dismisses an argument as untrue or absurd. The dismissal is made by... 18 KB (2,186 words) - 08:41, 20 May 2023 |
the fallacy of begging the question, the ad hominem fallacy and the appeal to ignorance. There is no general agreement as to how the various fallacies are... 39 KB (4,842 words) - 08:18, 13 February 2023 |
The fallacy of accident (also called destroying the exception or a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid) is an informal fallacy and a deductively... 2 KB (198 words) - 05:09, 21 February 2021 |
The gambler's fallacy, also known as the Monte Carlo fallacy or the fallacy of the maturity of chances, is the incorrect belief that, if a particular... 39 KB (5,499 words) - 19:12, 17 May 2023 |
absurd"). According to Strauss, reductio ad Hitlerum is a type of ad hominem, ad misericordiam, or a fallacy of irrelevance. The suggested rationale is... 14 KB (1,504 words) - 15:51, 28 April 2023 |
two ways to interpret "the relativist fallacy": either as identical to relativism (generally), or as the ad hoc adoption of a relativist stance purely... 4 KB (664 words) - 16:28, 20 February 2023 |
- Tu quoque (redirect from Logical fallacy/Ad hominem tu quoque)Dictionary. Oxford University Press. 2012. Retrieved 24 April 2016. "Fallacy: Ad Hominem Tu Quoque". Nizkor project. Retrieved 24 November 2015. Agassi...7 KB (765 words) - 21:06, 6 February 2023
- some of the most common examples of fallacies: Faulty Cause and Effect Relationship Also known as "Post Hoc fallacy." It assumes sequence of events for
Post hoc ergo propter hoc (Latin: 'after this, therefore because of this') is an informal fallacy that states: "Since event Y followed event X, event Y must have been caused by event X." It is often shortened simply to post hoc fallacy. A logical fallacy of the questionable cause variety, it is subtly different from the fallacy cum hoc ergo propter hoc ('with this, therefore because of this'), in which two events occur simultaneously or the chronological ordering is insignificant or unknown. Post hoc is a logical fallacy in which one event seems to be the cause of a later event because it occurred earlier. [1]
Post hoc is a particularly tempting error because correlation sometimes appears to suggest causality. The fallacy lies in a conclusion based solely on the order of events, rather than taking into account other factors potentially responsible for the result that might rule out the connection.[2]
A simple example is "The rooster crows immediately before sunrise; therefore the rooster causes the sun to rise."[3]
Pattern
The form of the post hoc fallacy is expressed as follows:
- A occurred, then B occurred.
- Therefore, A caused B.
When B is undesirable, this pattern is often combined with the formal fallacy of denying the antecedent, assuming the logical inverse holds: Avoiding A will prevent B.[4]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post_hoc_ergo_propter_hoc
| Part of the Politics series |
| Basic forms of government |
|---|
| List of forms of government |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Politics portal |
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autocracy
History and etymology
Autocracy comes from the Ancient Greek autos (Greek: αὐτός; "self") and kratos (Greek: κράτος; "power", "strength") from Kratos, the Greek personification of authority. In Medieval Greek, the term Autocrates was used for anyone holding the title emperor, regardless of the actual power of the monarch. The term was used in Ancient Greece and Rome with varying meanings. In the Middle Ages, the Byzantine Emperor was styled Autocrat of the Romans. Some historical Slavic monarchs such as Russian tsars and emperors, due to Byzantine influence, included the title Autocrat as part of their official styles, distinguishing them from the constitutional monarchs elsewhere in Europe.
Comparison with other forms of government
Both totalitarian and military dictatorship are often identified with, but need not be, an autocracy. Totalitarianism is a system where the state strives to control every aspect of life and civil society.[3] It can be headed by a supreme leader, making it autocratic, but it can also have a collective leadership such as a presidium, military junta, or a single political party as in the case of a one-party state.
Origin and developments
Examples from early modern Europe suggests early statehood was favorable for democracy.[4] According to Jacob Hariri, outside Europe, history shows that early statehood has led to autocracy.[5] The reasons he gives are continuation of the original autocratic rule and absence of "institutional transplantation" or European settlement.[5] This may be because of the country's capacity to fight colonization, or the presence of state infrastructure that Europeans did not need for the creation of new institutions to rule. In all the cases, representative institutions were unable to get introduced in these countries and they sustained their autocratic rule. European colonization was varied and conditional on many factors. Countries which were rich in natural resources had an extractive[?] and indirect rule whereas other colonies saw European settlement.[6] Because of this settlement, these countries possibly experienced setting up of new institutions. Colonization also depended on factor endowments and settler mortality.[5]
Mancur Olson theorizes the development of autocracies as the first transition from anarchy to state. For Olson, anarchy is characterized by a number of "roving bandits" who travel around many different geographic areas extorting wealth from local populations leaving little incentive for populations to invest and produce. As local populations lose the incentive to produce, there is little wealth for either the bandits to steal or the people to use. Olson theorizes autocrats as "stationary bandits" who solve this dilemma by establishing control over a small fiefdom and monopolize the extortion of wealth in the fiefdom in the form of taxes. Once an autocracy is developed, Olson theorizes that both the autocrat and the local population will be better off as the autocrat will have an "encompassing interest" in the maintenance and growth of wealth in the fiefdom. Because violence threatens the creation of rents, the "stationary bandit" has incentives to monopolize violence and to create a peaceful order.[7] Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard and G.T. Svendsen have argued that the Viking expansion and settlements in the 9th-11th centuries may be interpreted as an example of roving bandits becoming stationary.[8]
Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast describe autocracies as limited access orders that arise from this need to monopolize violence. In contrast to Olson, these scholars understand the early state not as a single ruler, but as an organization formed by many actors. They describe the process of autocratic state formation as a bargaining process among individuals with access to violence. For them, these individuals form a dominant coalition that grants each other privileges such as the access to resources. As violence reduces the rents, members of the dominant coalition have incentives to cooperate and to avoid fighting. A limited access to privileges is necessary to avoid competition among the members of the dominant coalition, who then will credibly commit to cooperate and will form the state.[9]
Closed vs Elected Autocracy
There are several significant distinctions between closed and elected autocracies, both of which are authoritarian types of governance in which one person or group has total authority.
A closed autocracy is a form of governance whereby all parties except for one official party are prohibited, although political independents who are not overtly anti-regime may occasionally be elected - this elite group faces no accountability from the population, as the population receives no civil liberties.[10] These people may acquire their positions of authority by inheritance, a coup, or other illegitimate methods, with no “choice” over their leader.[11] According to the 2022 V-Dem Democracy Report, there is a growing number of closed autocracies (30 countries as of 2020), that account for 26% of the global population.[12] In order to move a country toward liberal democracy in a closed autocracy, there needs to be an initial semi-liberal autocratic transition phase (unless they become occupied by foreign powers during a war who are willing to democratize).[10]
On the other hand, an elected autocracy is a form of government in which the autocrat gains control through a democratic procedure, such as an election.[13] Once in charge, an autocrat will, however, use their position to expand their authority, restrict the impact of other political figures, and attack democratic institutions like the court and the free press,[13] manipulating contestation to make turnover unlikely or impossible.[14] Although there may be some appearance of democracy under an elected autocracy, in reality the autocrat controls most of the authority and the public has little opportunity to hold them accountable, as with a closed autocracy. This is also referred to as a “hybrid regime that leans more toward the autocratic side”.[15] Elected autocracies are still considered to be the most common government structure globally - 44% of the world’s population live under this regime.[12] In order to move toward liberal democracy in an elected autocracy, the remaining barriers of illegitimacy and unfairness must be gradually removed.[10]
Maintenance
Because autocrats need a power structure to rule, it can be difficult to draw a clear line between historical autocracies and oligarchies. Most historical autocrats depended on their nobles, their merchants, the military, the priesthood, or other elite groups.[16] Some autocracies are rationalized by assertion of divine right; historically this has mainly been reserved for medieval kingdoms. In recent years researchers have found significant connections between the types of rules governing succession in monarchies and autocracies and the frequency with which coups or succession crises occur.[17]
According to Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, in limited access orders the state is ruled by a dominant coalition formed by a small elite group that relates to each other by personal relationships. To remain in power, this elite hinders people outside the dominant coalition to access organizations and resources. Autocracy is maintained as long as the personal relationships of the elite continue to forge the dominant coalition. These scholars further suggest that once the dominant coalition starts to become broader and allow for impersonal relationships, limited access orders can give place to open access orders.[9]
For Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, the allocation of political power explains the maintenance of autocracies which they usually refer to as "extractive states".[18] For them, the de jure political power comes from political institutions, whereas the de facto political power is determined by the distribution of resources. Those holding the political power in the present will design the political and economic institutions in the future according to their interests. In autocracies, both de jure and de facto political powers are concentrated in one person or a small elite that will promote institutions for keeping the de jure political power as concentrated as the de facto political power, thereby maintaining autocratic regimes with extractive institutions.
Yu-Ming Liou and Paul Musgrave have found evidence that resource-rich autocracies often times apply antisocial policies in order to harm targeted groups (for example, restricting women's autonomy, especially in Middle Eastern autocracies) as a form of strategy to stay in power.[19]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autocracy
Historical examples
 | This section possibly contains original research. (September 2020) |
-2.jpg)
- The Roman Empire, which Augustus founded following the end of the Roman Republic in 27 BC. Augustus officially kept the Roman Senate while effectively consolidating all of the real power in himself. Rome was generally peaceful and prosperous until the imperial rule of Commodus starting in 180 AD. The crisis of the Third Century saw the barbarian invasions and insurrections by prominent generals as well as economic decline. Both Diocletian and Maximian ruled as autocratic leaders, strengthening the control of the emperor in a phase known as Dominate. The empire was extremely large, difficult to govern by a single emperor, and was ruled by a tetrarchy, instituted by Diocletian. Eventually, it was split into two halves, namely the Western and the Eastern. The Western Roman Empire fell in 476 after civic unrest, further economic decline and invasions led to the surrender of Romulus Augustus to Odoacer, a Germanic king.[25] On the other hand, the Eastern Roman Empire survived until 1453, with the Fall of Constantinople. Its rulers' main titles in Greek were Autokrator and Basileus.
- The Eastern Han dynasty of China under Dong Zhuo.[26]
- Tsarist and Imperial Russia under Tsar Ivan the Terrible. Shortly after being crowned as ruler, Ivan IV immediately removed his political enemies by execution or exile and established dominance over the Russian empire, expanding the borders of his kingdom dramatically. To enforce his rule, Ivan established the Streltzy as Russia's standing army and developed two cavalry divisions that were fiercely loyal to the Tsar. He also established the Cossacks and the Oprichniki. In his later years, Ivan made orders for his forces to sack the city of Novgorod in fear of being overthrown. The ideology Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality was introduced by Emperor Nicholas I of Russia and would last until its fall in the Russian Revolution and the rise of Vladimir Lenin.[27][28]
- The Tokugawa shogunate, a period of Japanese history which followed a series of conflicts between warring clans, states, and rulers. Tokugawa Ieyasu seized control of all of Japan through a mix of superior tactics and diplomacy, until he became the undisputed shogun (military ruler of Japan). The shogunate established by Tokugawa and continued by his successors controlled all aspects of life, closing the borders of Japan to all foreign nations and ruling with a policy of isolationism known as sakoku.
- Sweden during the reigns of Gustav I (1523–1560), Charles XI and Charles XII (1680–1718), and Gustav III and Gustav IV Adolf (1772–1809).[29]
- Denmark–Norway under the House of Oldenburg.
- The French Republic and the French Empire from 1799 to 1814 under Napoleon Bonaparte.
- The Ottoman Empire from 1878 to 1908 under Abdul Hamid II.[30][31]
- The Soviet Union during the tenure of Joseph Stalin in addition to other Soviet leaders. The Soviet Union was founded by Vladimir Lenin in 1922 following the Russian Civil War (1917–1922), and several of its leaders have been considered autocratic.[citation needed] Political repression occurred in the Soviet Union until its dissolution in 1991.
- Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini.
- Empire of Japan under Emperor Hirohito and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.
- Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler.
- Francoist Spain under Francisco Franco (1939-1975).[32]
- Indonesia under Suharto's New Order (1966–1998).
- Greece under the military junta of Georgios Papadopoulos (1967–1974).
- Brazil under Getúlio Vargas (1930-45)
- Paraguay under the government of Alfredo Stroessner.
- The People’s Republic of China under the leadership of Mao Zedong.
- Cuba under Fidel Castro.
_(cropped).jpg)
- Haiti under François Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier during the period of Family dynastic dictatorship in the Caribbean.
- The Republic of Zaire under the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko in Africa.
- Syria under Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad
- Libya under Muammar Gaddafi
- Iran under Ruhollah Khomeini.
- North Korea has been under the Kim dynasty beginning with Kim Il Sung since 1948.
- Taiwan under Chiang Kai-Shek.
- Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko
- Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and currently Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
- The Russian Federation under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.
See also
- Absolute monarchy
- Anocracy
- Autarchism
- Authoritarianism
- Caudillo
- Centralisation
- Caesaropapism
- Despotism
- Dictatorship
- Führerprinzip
- Kleptocracy
- Monocracy
- Political polarization
- Ruscism
- Theocracy
- Triumvirate
- Tsarist autocracy
- Tyranny
- Theonomy
References
- Esteban Navarro, Miguel Ángel (1987). "La categorización política del Franquismo. Un análisis de las principales aportaciones historiográficas". Brocar: Cuadernos de investigación histórica (in Spanish). Publicaciones Universidad de La Rioja (13): 12. ISSN 1885-8309.
[...] su naturaleza antidemocrática en el mundo político y social, la actitud represiva, la continuidad autocrática en la jefatura del Estado, [...]
External links
- Felix Bethke: "Research on Autocratic Regimes: Divide et Impera", Katapult-Magazine (2015-03-15)
| Authority control: National |
|---|
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autocracy
No comments:
Post a Comment