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Saturday, May 20, 2023

05-20-2023-0010 - variety, etc. (draft)

In science and philosophy, a just-so story is an untestable narrative explanation for a cultural practice, a biological trait, or behavior of humans or other animals. The pejorative[1] nature of the expression is an implicit criticism that reminds the listener of the essentially fictional and unprovable nature of such an explanation. Such tales are common in folklore genres like mythology (where they are known as etiological myths – see etiology). A less pejorative term is a pourquoi story, which has been used to describe usually more mythological or otherwise traditional examples of this genre, aimed at children.

This phrase is a reference to Rudyard Kipling's 1902 Just So Stories, containing fictional and deliberately fanciful tales for children, in which the stories pretend to explain animal characteristics, such as the origin of the spots on the leopard.[2][3] It has been used to criticize evolutionary explanations of traits that have been proposed to be adaptations, particularly in the evolution–creation debates[4] and in debates regarding research methods in sociobiology[2] and evolutionary psychology.[1]

However, the first widely acknowledged use of the phrase in the modern and pejorative sense seems to have originated in 1978 with Stephen Jay Gould, a prominent paleontologist and popular science writer.[5] Gould expressed deep skepticism as to whether evolutionary psychology could ever provide objective explanations for human behavior, even in principle; additionally, even if it were possible to do so, Gould did not think that it could be proven in a properly scientific way.[5]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-so_story

Ipse dixit (Latin for "he said it himself") is an assertion without proof, or a dogmatic expression of opinion.[1][2]

The fallacy of defending a proposition by baldly asserting that it is "just how it is" distorts the argument by opting out of it entirely: the claimant declares an issue to be intrinsic, and not changeable.[3] 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ipse_dixit

An origin myth is a myth that describes the origin of some feature of the natural or social world. One type of origin myth is the creation or cosmogonic myth, a story that describes the creation of the world. However, many cultures have stories set in a time after a first origin - such stories aim to account for the beginnings of natural phenomena or of human institutions within a preexisting universe.

In Graeco-Roman scholarship, the terms etiological myth and aition (from the Ancient Greek αἴτιον, "cause") are sometimes used for a myth that explains an origin, particularly how an object or custom came into existence. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_myth

The "eternal return" is an idea for interpreting religious behavior proposed by the historian Mircea Eliade; it is a belief expressed through behavior (sometimes implicitly, but often explicitly) that one is able to become contemporary with or return to the "mythical age"—the time when the events described in one's myths occurred.[1] It should be distinguished from the philosophical concept of eternal return

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternal_return_(Eliade)

A hierophany is a manifestation of the sacred. The word is a formation of the Greek adjective hieros (Greek: ἱερός, 'sacred, holy') and the verb phainein (φαίνειν, 'to reveal, to bring to light').  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hierophany

In philosophy of science and epistemology, the demarcation problem is the question of how to distinguish between science and non-science.[1] It examines the boundaries between science, pseudoscience and other products of human activity, like art and literature and beliefs.[2][3] The debate continues after over two millennia of dialogue among philosophers of science and scientists in various fields.[4][5] The debate has consequences for what can be called "scientific" in fields such as education and public policy.[6]: 26, 35  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem

"Apodictic", also spelled "apodeictic" (Ancient Greek: ἀποδεικτικός, "capable of demonstration"), is an adjectival expression from Aristotelean logic that refers to propositions that are demonstrably, necessarily or self-evidently true.[1] Apodicticity or apodixis is the corresponding abstract noun, referring to logical certainty.

Apodictic propositions contrast with assertoric propositions, which merely assert that something is (or is not) true, and with problematic propositions, which assert only the possibility of something's being true. Apodictic judgments are clearly provable or logically certain. For instance, "Two plus two equals four" is apodictic, because it is true by definition. "Chicago is larger than Omaha" is assertoric. "A corporation could be wealthier than a country" is problematic. In Aristotelian logic, "apodictic" is opposed to "dialectic", as scientific proof is opposed to philosophical reasoning. Kant contrasted "apodictic" with "problematic" and "assertoric" in the Critique of Pure Reason, on page A70/B95.[2] 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apodicticity

Hans Reichenbach, one of the founders of logical positivism, offered a modified version of Immanuel Kant's a priorism by distinguishing between apodictic a priorism and constitutive a priorism.[3] 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apodicticity

Cicero's De Divinatione implicitly used five criteria of scientific demarcation that are also used by modern philosophers of science.[13] 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Verificationism, also known as the verification principle or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is the philosophical doctrine which asserts that a statement is meaningful only if it is either empirically verifiable (i.e. confirmed through the senses) or a truth of logic (e.g., tautologies).

Verificationism rejects statements of metaphysics, theology, ethics, and aesthetics, as "cognitively meaningless".[citation needed] Such statements may be meaningful in influencing emotions or behavior, but not in terms of conveying truth value, information, or factual content.[1] Verificationism was a central theme of logical positivism, a movement in analytic philosophy that emerged in the 1920s by philosophers who sought to unify philosophy and science under a common naturalistic theory of knowledge. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verificationism

In philosophy of science and in epistemology, instrumentalism is a methodological view that ideas are useful instruments, and that the worth of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting phenomena. According to instrumentalists, a successful scientific theory reveals nothing known either true or false about nature's unobservable objects, properties or processes.[1] Scientific theory is merely a tool whereby humans predict observations in a particular domain of nature by formulating laws, which state or summarize regularities, while theories themselves do not reveal supposedly hidden aspects of nature that somehow explain these laws.[2] Instrumentalism is a perspective originally introduced by Pierre Duhem in 1906.[2]

Rejecting scientific realism's ambitions to uncover metaphysical truth about nature,[2] instrumentalism is usually categorized as an antirealism, although its mere lack of commitment to scientific theory's realism can be termed nonrealism. Instrumentalism merely bypasses debate concerning whether, for example, a particle spoken about in particle physics is a discrete entity enjoying individual existence, or is an excitation mode of a region of a field, or is something else altogether.[3][4][5] Instrumentalism holds that theoretical terms need only be useful to predict the phenomena, the observed outcomes.[3]

There are multiple versions of instrumentalism. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumentalism

Ramsey sentences are formal logical reconstructions of theoretical propositions attempting to draw a line between science and metaphysics. A Ramsey sentence aims at rendering propositions containing non-observable theoretical terms (terms employed by a theoretical language) clear by substituting them with observational terms (terms employed by an observation language, also called empirical language).

Ramsey sentences were introduced by the logical empiricist philosopher Rudolf Carnap. However, they should not be confused with Carnap sentences, which are neutral on whether there exists anything to which the term applies. [1] 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramsey_sentence

Scientific anti-realism

In philosophy of science, anti-realism applies chiefly to claims about the non-reality of "unobservable" entities such as electrons or genes, which are not detectable with human senses.[20][21]

One prominent variety of scientific anti-realism is instrumentalism, which takes a purely agnostic view towards the existence of unobservable entities, in which the unobservable entity X serves as an instrument to aid in the success of theory Y and does not require proof for the existence or non-existence of X. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-realism#Scientific_anti-realism

Moral anti-realism

In the philosophy of ethics, moral anti-realism (or moral irrealism) is a meta-ethical doctrine that there are no objective moral values or normative facts. It is usually defined in opposition to moral realism, which holds that there are objective moral values, such that a moral claim may be either true or false. Specifically the moral anti-realist is committed to denying one of the following three statements: [22][23]

  1. The Semantic Thesis: Moral statements have meaning, they express propositions, or are the kind of things that can be true or false.
  2. The Alethic Thesis: Some moral propositions are true.
  3. The Metaphysical Thesis: The metaphysical status of moral facts is robust and ordinary, not importantly different from other facts about the world.

Different version of moral anti-realism deny different statements: specifically, non-cognitivism denies the first claim, arguing that moral statements have no meaning or truth content,[24] error theory denies the second claim, arguing that all moral statements are false,[25] and ethical subjectivism denies the third claim, arguing that the truth of moral statements is mind dependent.[26]

Examples of anti-realist moral theories might be:[27]

There is a debate as to whether moral relativism is actually an anti-realist position. While many versions deny the metaphysical thesis, some do not, as one could imagine a system of morality which requires you to obey the written laws in your country.[28] Such a system would be a version of moral relativism, as different individuals would be required to follow different laws, but the moral facts are physical facts about the world, not mental facts, so they are metaphysically ordinary. Thus, different versions of moral relativism might be considered anti-realist or realist.[29] 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-realism#Scientific_anti-realism

In philosophy, the term idealism identifies and describes metaphysical perspectives which assert that reality is indistinguishable and inseparable from perception and understanding; that reality is a mental construct closely connected to ideas.[1] Idealist perspectives are in two categories: subjective idealism, which proposes that a material object exists only to the extent that a human being perceives the object; and objective idealism, which proposes the existence of an objective consciousness that exists prior to and independently of human consciousness, thus the existence of the object is independent of human perception.

The philosopher George Berkeley said that the essence of an object is to be perceived. By contrast, Immanuel Kant said that idealism "does not concern the existence of things," but that "our modes of representation" of things such as space and time are not "determinations that belong to things in themselves," but are essential features of the human mind.[2] In the philosophy of "transcendental idealism" Kant proposes that the objects of experience relied upon their existence in the human mind that perceives the objects, and that the nature of the thing-in-itself is external to human experience, and cannot be conceived without the application of categories, which give structure to the human experience of reality. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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